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Hungary is in transition to democracy. The country is democratizing its
institutions, including the armed forces. The process of establishing democratic civil-
military relations, adequate command and force structures as well as re-professionalization
of the military personal is based on Euro-Atlantic model. In democratic civil-military
relations the military must be excluded from political decision-making. However, as the
cases of established liberal democracies demonstrate, the military often attempts to exert
influence on political decisions.
The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 dealt
with the question of how much influence the military should have, and who should
exercise this influence. By strengthening the position of the Chairman of the JCS, who is
the principal military adviser, the Congress intended to improve professional military
advice. Even though the American society generally evaluates Goldwater-Nichols as a
success, opinions on the consequences of the Act vary considerably. The thesis argues that
a Chairman fully exploiting his position and bringing subjectivity into decision-making
process can weaken the civilian authority over the military, which contradicts the
intentions of the legislation.
Hungary can make good use of the U.S. case in finding the appropriate balance
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Countries at varying stages of democracy confront different problems of civil-
military relations. Established liberal democracies, such as the United States, face the
challenge of crystallizing civil-military relations adjusting them to meet the requirements of
the Post-Cold War era. Countries establishing democratic civil-military relations, such as
Hungary, are preoccupied with the issues of democratic control, military professionalism,
and the accommodation ofthe military in a democratic society.
In a democratic society the military must be under objective civilian control and
must be depoliticized. Its members must also be loyal to the constitution and serve under
the concept of the "citizen-soldier." In the process of the transition to democracy and
democratic consolidation, much depends on the values and behavior of high-ranking
military officers and how they can influence the evolution of civil-military relations.
This thesis examines how the relative degree and institutional structure of power
delegated to high-ranking military officials affects political decision-making in democratic
nations. I argue that the relative authority and policy-making role of the military, especially
that of high-ranking military officials, is of crucial importance to democratic civil-military
relations. In particular, the role and influence of the highest ranking military official is
decisive to the function of the checks and balances between military and society. This
carries implications for the future of democracy for such nations as Hungary.
The level and structure of power delegated to high-ranking military officials must
be carefully determined by legislation to avoid undesirable military intervention into the
political decision-making process, which can undermine the principles of objective civilian
control over the armed forces and can ultimately upset the governing principles of
democracy.
In the transition to and consolidation of democracy, some kind of interactive
process between the military and civilian side must exist, which can bridge civilian goals
and military means. The most important person playing the balancing role between civilian
and military interests, beside the Minister of Defense, is the highest ranking military
commander, the Chief of Staff of the armed forces, or the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of
IX
Staff, if such a structure exists. He is in the position to influence political decisions,
including decisions on strategic alternatives regarding national security objectives and
contingency planning. This case is most familiar through the United States decision-
making process, which forms a the principal case study of this work.
During the Cold War, the organizational independence of the U.S. armed services
led to deficiencies in defense operations and in the defense decision-making process. These
flaws weakened the strategy-making capability of the government. The Goldwater-Nichols
Department ofDefense Reorganization Act of 1986 attempted to solve these problems by
redistributing power and institutional roles in the Department of Defense. In particular,
Goldwater-Nichols Act attempted to strengthen civilian authority over the military
establishment and increase the quality of professional advice to the President and the
Secretary ofDefensej
This thesis argues that by tremendously strengthening the role of the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the detriment of service chiefs, and giving great emphasis to
Joint Staff under full supervision of the Chairman, the military's influence on political
decision-making has grown substantially. The Goldwater-Nichols Act may have made the
decision-making system more effective, but this efficiency has come at the expense of the
Secretary's and Congress' ability to exercise civilian control over the military. These
consequences contradict the basic intentions of the legislation.
According to the principles of democratic civilian control, the military should be
excluded from the political decision-making process on national security issues. The
guarantees for avoiding military intervention in policy making have to be formulated in the
constitutional provisions, and at the same time backed up by institutional arrangements.
The level and structure of power delegated to high-ranking military officials should be
based on checks and balances. The stronger the military's voice and bigger its influence on
political decision-making, the less command authority it should have over the armed
forces. The present position of the Chairman ofJCS clearly demonstrates this principle.
Regardless the explicit approach to the military's role in the political decision-
making, civil-military cooperation in solving security related issues is important. One of
the possibilities for improving this cooperation is a closer interaction on executive level
between the agencies involved in formulating defense strategies and policies. The United
States has provided this cooperation by employing civilian experts in military agencies, and
military experts in civilian ministries. Another option is the establishment of a National
Security Council to formulate national security policies. Even though this approach has
not always worked in the United States, such body could bring together ministries of
Foreign Affairs, Defense, Interior, Finance, and Industry to formulate policy and provide
clear directions to the armed forcesj
The defense reorganization in Hungary in 1996-97 gave the Hungarian military
more influence over security-related decisions. It is now up the military side to determine
how it should exploit this opportunity, and up to the executive branch to determine how to




A. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Central and Eastern European countries find themselves in transition from a
communist system to democracy. During this transformation of state and society,
institutional re-arrangements are under way. The much desired final product is contained
in the nations' democratic constitutions. Each political system provides an inherent
structure of civil-military relations, which affects the role of the military in the society, its
structure and its level of influence on democratic processes and political decision-making.
When states change from one political system to another, they must also re-order their
civil-military relations to ensure that the military plays a role that accords with the
principles, norms and values ofthe new political system. 1
Countries at varying stages of democracy will confront different aspects of civil-
military relations. Established liberal democracies, such as the United States, face the
situation of crystallizing civil-military relations and are trying rapidly to adjust them to the
changing conditions since 1989. Countries establishing democratic civil-mihtary relations,
such as Hungary, are preoccupied with the issues of democratic control, military
professionalism, and the accommodation of the military in a democratic society.
In a democratic society the military must be under objective civilian control and
must be depoliticized, its members must be loyal to the constitution and serve under the
concept of the 'citizen-soldier." In the process of the transition to democracy and
democratic consolidation, much depends on the values and behavior of high-ranking
military officers and how they can influence the evolution of civil-military relations.
I
This thesis examines how the relative degree and institutional structure of power
delegated to high-ranking military officials affects political decision-making in a
democratic country. One can well argue that the relative authority and policy-making role
of the military, especially that of high-ranking military officials, is of crucial importance to
democratic civil-military relations. In particular, the role and influence of the highest
1 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Militarv Relations.
Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1957, p. 2.
ranking military official is decisive to the function of the checks and balances between
military and society. This carries implications for the future of democracy for such nations
as Hungary.
'One of the basic tenets of representative democracy is that politicians who
exercise political power are answerable to those who have elected them, and in whose
name they formulate and implement policies."" The military establishment has
constitutional accountability through the government for its actions, but not for the
policies it implements. According to the premise of popular sovereignty, the
democratically constituted civilian authority can legitimate policies, including defense and
security policy.
3
'The civilian executive authority has the power, (and also the obligation
vis-a-vis the electorate) to determine the size, type and composition of the armed forces,
to define concepts, to propose budgets, etc., for which it needs confirmation by the
legislature."
4
Furthermore, the civilian head of state who is usually the commander-in-
chief, and the Minister/Secretary of Defense bear principal responsibility before the polity
for the security and defense policy of the state, and thus derives their role in the
democratic civil-military relations ofthe nation.
Such nations as Hungary confront the key question restructuring their civil-military
relations; 'Should those military officers responsible for carrying out a policy have a voice
in framing it?". In the United States, the National Defense Act of 1947 legitimized this
'Voice" by creating the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who were to coordinate, but not
command, the armed forces. The amendments of 1949 to this act created the position of
the Chairman of JCS, who became the advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense.
The second question at stake is the question of means (strategies, tactics, and weapons)
which the military uses in executing political decisions and the power of purse versus
combat experience and service doctrines. The answers to these questions are based on two
fundamental principles. On the one hand a) the military must obtain real professionalism,
2
Rudolf Joo, "The Democratic Control of Armed Forces, The Experience of Hungary", Challiot Paper 23,




For a detailed discussion, see Kenneth W. Kemp and Charles Hudlin, "Civil Supremacy Over the
Military; Its Nature and Limits", Armed Forces and Society, vol. 19, no. 1, Fall 1992, pp. 8-9.
and on the other hand b) in activities related to the military, the executive authority has to
rely on military expertise.
Although the armed forces play an important role in maintaining the state and in
carrying out political decisions related to national security, in democratic societies the
officers and soldiers must respect democratic civilian control and remain non-partisan as a
pre-condition for establishing the ideal of the democratic citizen-soldier. 5 In practice it
means that the country has to commit herself to the 'rigorous observance of the principles
of non-involvement in politics of the armed forces at all levels of the military hierarchy"6
One can argue, therefore, that the decision on authority and policy-making role of
the military is of major importance. The level and structure of power delegated to high-
ranking military officials must be carefully determined by legislation to avoid undesirable
military intervention into the political decision-making process, which can undermine the
principles of objective civilian control over the armed forces and can ultimately upset the
governing principles of democracy. 7
/The history of the American defense establishment offers a wide variety of
problems and solutions to be examined in this study, especially in the period beginning
with 1943-47. '[Centralization was a dominant trend in all reorganizations of the US
military establishment, a trend always supported by reformers, and always resisted by
those whose roles it threatened." 8 Centralization resolves a problem, but at the same time
it creates another one. Centralization creates a new layer of authority at a certain level in
the organizational pyramid that reduces the authority below. 9 Centralizing power,
especially political power might be a dangerous tendency, because it can lead to abuse of
power, which can threaten a social structure. In a democratic society the concentration of








Vincent Davis, "The Evolution of the Central US Defense Management". In Reorganizing America's
Defense, Leadership in War and Peace, edited by Robert J. Art, Vincent Davis, Samuel P. Huntington,
New York: Pergamon Press Inc., 1985, p. 150.
9
Ibid., p. 150.
In the American military establishment the first steps toward centralization and
service unification were taken in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War when the
Joint Army-Navy Board was created in 1903, which can be considered as a forerunner to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff system.
10
In 1916 the Council of National Defense was
established, which was a cabinet-level committee, and represented the first effort to
achieve some centralization on military matters at the highest civilian levels. This body can
be regarded as a predecessor to the National Security Council, which was created after
W.W.n. 11 Concerning the power struggle between the civilian and military sides, one can
suggest that the period starting with the National Security Act of 1947 and its
amendments in 1949 was more relevant to the topic, since it brought forth the key players
and organizations which influence the political decision-making process. However, it
would be a mistake to deem this period separately from the rest of the entire evolutionary
process, because such factors as service rivalry played an important role in the whole
evolution.
B. IMPORTANCE OF THE TOPIC
The thesis examines the problem of civil-military interaction affecting political
decisions in the field of national security. It seeks to draw lessons for partner countries
involved in NATO initiated Partnership for Peace (PfP) program as is Hungary. The latter
presently searches for the delicate balance between civilian and military influence on these
decisions.1 Even though the Armed Forces of the Republic of Hungary will be functioning
in a similar system as adopted in the United States, neither the model or structure itself nor
its direct applicability matters. Rather, what is important is: a) how the forces interact in
this system, and b) how the key players (the Congress, the President, the Secretary of
Defense and the Chairman of the JCS) make political decisions or influence them.
After the democratic transformation began in the mid-1980s and culminated at the
turn of the decade in 1989-90, Hungary dismantled the old, socialist type military





both in military minds and uniformed organizations. It is as if one has ripped the skeleton
and head out of a body, to leave behind a mass of bones, muscles and nerves. How can it
really work? In the case of Hungary, the country has chosen the model of the West to
rebuild the supreme command and the senior military leadership from the wreckage of the
totalitarian model.
Civil-military relations in former communist countries showed the same pattern,
and they can be best understood by examining the nature of the communist state and the
relationship between the military, the government and the Communist Party. The
communist Party's leading role created a system in which the party reigned supreme, and
its hegemony depended on its ability to control the non-party institutions of the state. 12
The Party and the government structures were interconnected in two ways: first, all
important government officials, generals, and most of the officer corps were party
members, subject to party discipline and directives; and second, joint party-government
committees developed national policies and served as institutional links between the two
structures.
13
Moreover, the Central Committee of the Communist Party had the authority to
make policy and to oversee its execution, while government institutions, including the
Ministry of Defense directly implemented these policies. 14 'Communist Party direction of
the armed forces was neither democratic nor truly civilian but it was real, and in most
cases, quite effective."
15
" The communist Party did not exercise democratic control,
because its institutions and mechanisms lacked the basic requirements of democratic
control and accountability." 16 Secondly, Communist Party control was not the same thing
as genuine civilian control, at least not in a sense that the term is used in Western
democracies.
17 The reason for this fact is that in a one-party system there are no clear-cut
12
BradleyR Gitz, Armed Forces and Political Power in Eastern Europe. New York: Greenwood Press,
1992, p. 8.
13








Chris Donelly, "Military-Civil Relations in Post-Communist Systems: Common Problems". In Ci\il-
Military Relations in the Post-Communist States in Eastern and Central Europe, edited by John K.
Skogan, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1993, pp. 7-8.
dividing lines between the institutions of the society; thus, the policy-making process very
often remains obscure, informal or hidden.
18
The ultimate result of the interconnection between the military and the civilian
sides was that the military was involved in political decision-making and the civilian side
was involved in the professional aspects or the execution of those political decisions. As
Ellen Jones claims, the officers in the Ministry ofDefense held a monopoly of expertise on
defense issues and military matters, which enabled them to directly influence the policy-
making process, although they were not autonomous actors in that process. 19
Consequently, one hopes that this thesis proves important for Hungary since this
country struggles with the level of power and authority of military leadership. On the one
hand, there are problems deriving from the inherited military structure, political decision-
making processes, and inadequate interagency cooperation. Old reflexes endure, especially
in the military, which enjoyed many privileges during the communist regime. It is
extremely difficult to change the mentality of more senior military personnel and it also
takes time to bring new democratic ideas into the military. Most significant is propagation
of the professionalism of the Armed Forces based on the Euro-Atlantic model. The
difficulty of this issue might be easily explained by the fact that if the domestic social and
international environment changes, the defense establishment has to be changed as well in
order to face the challenges successfully. As the recent regional security environment
suggests, these challenges may vary from light to severe. Regardless of changing
circumstances, however, the country has to defend its sovereignty, and moreover, to fulfill
the tasks coming from coalition obligations.
C. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
The '{representatives of the military establishment can have great influence in the
early stages of the decision-making process and their input is significant throughout the







at hand in this analysis can be formulated as follows. In any form of undemocratic society,
the armed forces play an important role in maintaining the regime, thus they, as political
allies, are involved in the political processes. Through this involvement in state functions,
high-ranking military officials gain certain advantages, above all - political power. With the
change to a democratic form of regime, where civilian control over the military must
prevail, the military has to give up the political power that has enabled it to enjoy certain
privileges.
21
In the later stage of democratic transition and during the consolidation of
democracy, some kind of interactive process between the military and civilian side must
exist, which can bridge civilian goals and military means. The most important person
playing the balancing role between civilian and military interests, beside the Minister of
Defense, is the highest ranking military commander, the Chief of Staff of the armed forces,
or the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, if such a structure exists. He is in the position to
affect decision-making regarding the implementation of political decision, including
decisions on strategic alternatives regarding national security objectives and contingency
planning
22
. The later case is most familiar through the United States decision-making
process, which forms a major lecture of this work.
On the other hand, the Chief of Staff has the capability to strive for political power
directly or indirectly in order to find a political ally to create better material conditions for
the military, have credible professional guidance from the civilian side, avoid
unsatisfactory bargaining conditions, achieve full accommodation of the forces in the
society, find mutual trust and confidence in one of the political players, make the military's
threat assessment accepted, prove its professionalism, and preserve the armed forces'
privileges provided they are not regulated by the new constitutional provisions.
The professional military desires to achieve as much influence on the political
decision-making process as possible. The Chiefs of Staff of the services or the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff can significantly influence this process through their advice to
21
Alfred Stephanu Rethinking Military Politics, Brazil and the Southern Cone. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1988, pp. 126-127.
22
Dougles C. Lovelace, Jr., Unification of the United States Armed Forces: Implementing the 1986
Department of Defense Reorganization Act Strategic Studies Institute, August 6, 1996, p. 38.
the Minister of Defense or the President of the country, since the President is the
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. In a service-oriented military structure, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is also regarded as a buffer between the chiefs of
different services and the civilian side.
23 He will filter the decisions made with regard to
the interests of the services and the common interests all the services involved, thus
releasing pressure on the different services and maintaining a healthy balance between the
services.
24
Consequently, the legislation will not have to face the direct requirements
manifested by the separate services, but a balanced wish list finalized by the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
25
Ultimately, the level of influence of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
depends on two factors. First, it is basically determined by the personality of the
Chairman. A Strong" Chairman can significantly influence political decisions through his
advice to the President or the Defense Committee of the Parliament, in the case of
parliamentary democracies. The second major factor, in my opinion, is the support the
Chairman gets from the different services. Strong support from below based on joint
objectives of the services makes him a stable advocate of professional ideas and concepts.
But the common objectives articulated by the different services is born in very
controversial circumstances due to the inherent and opposing nature of the services'
requirements. In my thesis I examine the case of the United States in conjunction to the
given topic.
D. METHODOLOGY
In this thesis, the methodology of a single case study is used. This methodology, as
well as the others, has advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, analyzing a single
case does not allow invention or observance of patterns in the processes, nor does it
permit the generation of comprehensive ideas or conclusions. However, on the other hand,
!3
William J. Lynn, "The Wars Within: The Joint Military Structure and Its Critics". In Reorganizing
America's Defense, Leadership in War and Peace, edited by Robert J. Art, Vincent Davis, Samuel P.







a single case study enables the author to examine in depth the processes without damaging
significant details related exclusively to a particular country. The question may be obvious:
why employ the U.S. case? The reason is the model of democratic development of the
United States serves as an example not only for fledgling neo-democracies of Central and
Eastern Europe, for instance, but also for established liberal democracies.
27 The United
States is the leading world power in shaping the new security environment, which
hopefully will prove to lead to greater security than in previous decades. The United
States is the leading nation in preparing and maintaining the Euro-Atlantic defense
organization (NATO) for these new challenges.
The case of the United States can serve many lessons for Hungary for many
reasons. One is that structural changes, which are well under way in the Hungarian
defense establishment, are based on the model developed and applied by the United States
Armed Forces, namely the establishment of independent services; the Army and Air Force.
It is also useful to apply the required command structure: Chiefs of Staff of the armed
services, the Joint Chiefs Staff, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition,
this structure has already undergone many changes and modifications since the middle of
this century, depending on the domestic and international security environment, thus
serving as an example for Hungary to erect its model.
Moreover, the United States has been living under democracy for more than two
hundred years and has managed to develop a firm, but flexible system of objective civilian
control over the military, which can serve as an example for many consolidated and
developing democracies. The civilian element of democratic oversight is very powerful in
the United States and able to prevent any long-term diversion from the principles of
democratic civilian control.
Chapter II of my thesis examines the mutual process of accommodation of the
military in a democratic society the related constitutional provisions and institutional
arrangements, as necessary preconditions to avoid military involvement in political
decision-making. Chapter III contains a brief overview of the evolution of the central U.S.
27 Marc F. Plattner, "The Democratic Moment". In Global Resurgence ofDemocracy, edited by Larry
Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, p. 37.
9
defense leadership and management, focusing especially on the second half of the 20th
century. Chapter IV elaborates on the preconditions of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act, as well as on the act itself and the intended
and unintended consequences. Chapter V examines the prerequisites of civil-military
relations in the case of a successful transition to democracy, and attempts to give
recommendations to new democracies on how to shape the level and structure of power
given to high-ranking military officials.
The transformation of the military and civil-military relations is a gradual process,
similarly to democratic transition. 'If democracy works in other respects, it is likely over
time to bring progress in civil-military relations as well."
28
'As democratic institutions
sink firm roots and popular commitment to the constitutional deepens, the scope for
military to intervene in politics, or even to rattle its sabers menacingly, diminishes."
29
This
statement underlines the importance of democratic constitution and institutional
arrangements.
The transformation of civil-military relations begins on the domestic stage, but 'as
new democracies become established and more economically developed, they become
more viable partners for participation in democratic collective security arrangements that
generate powerful additional pressure (political, normative and structural) for civilian
supremacy over the military"
30
. That is why in the case of such former socialist countries
such as Hungary, consolidating democratic achievements and the successful solution of
the entire problem of civil-military relations puts a double burden on legislators because
the issue itself represents a fairly new phenomenon in the society. The transformation of
civil-military relations in Hungary must be resolved in light of possible future NATO
membership. It means that democratic institutions and processes must be established in
such a way that they could satisfy the conditions of a higher level in democratic
coexistence in the future European security architecture.
28
Civil-Military Relations and Democracy, edited by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, Baltimore:






H. CONSTITUTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
'Democratization of civil-military relations needs to rely on processes of
bargaining, dialogue, cooperation, and consensus-building that generally diminish military
prerogatives and redefine and professionalize the military's mission through a series of
incremental steps."
This chapter highlights the basic tasks of an emerging democracy concerning the
accommodation of the military establishment in the society, and elaborates on the
phenomenon of bargaining between the civilians and the military in order to establish
objective civilian control over the armed forces. Furthermore, it outlines the constitutional
provisions, institutional arrangements and the involvement of top military leaders in
political decision-making as well as the desirable level and structure of power delegated to
high-ranking military officials in a transition to democracy. Among all the changes and
arrangements in the new democratic society, constitutional provisions are vital to
guarantee the sufficient place of the military.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES
It is in the interest of every sovereign democratic state to possess armed forces
capable of defending national and universal values of the society. Every nation has the
right to self-defense, which means the establishment of an armed forces within the society.
But if such a body is established the nation has to decide on its missions, size, and first of
all it has to determine the political objectives for which this "tool" can be used.
This very right for establishing the armed forces must be formulated in the
Constitution together with the checks and balances of its operation to be able to avoid the
undesirable consequence of the armed body; the danger that can be posed to the state by
the same 'tool". The Constitution of the United States stands as the best example of how
to put the military under constitutional provisions. In May 1787 one of the first tasks of
the framers of the American Constitution was in the area of military affairs 'to empower
31 Diamond and Plattner, p. xxx.
11
the government to possess a military establishment in peacetime"
32
. 'fTJhe convention
wrote into the Constitution a series of provisions designed to give Congress complete and
comprehensive powers."
The armed forces in every society represent an organization that consumes goods
for which it provides security for the nation as a whole. As a consequence, the armed
forces both in peacetime, and more intensively in wartime require substantial resources.
That is why in August of the same year, after realizing the deficiency in formulation, 'the
Committee of Detail's original version; 'To raise armies" was amended to include the
words 'and support", which clarified and strengthened the grant of power to permit the
Congress to take whatever steps concerning pay, supplies, impressments, or other activity
were needed to keep an army on foot, in peace, or in war"34 .
Even before the armed forces are established and kept operational, it is absolutely
important to make rules and laws for their operations. It means that the Constitution must
determine the rules of the game within a democratic society, concerning the control over
the regular or standing army. It is widely believed that regular armed forces can undermine
democratic institutions in two ways. One case, when the active military personnel nurses
political ambitions, and the other when an active politician or politicians intend to use the
armed forces, originally nominated for use in foreign and domestic conflicts, in order to
preserve their political dominance even in the face of lost electoral support.
'The Founders succeeded in creating constitutional structures that unambiguously
subordinated the armed forces to political rule, and at the same time divided central
control over defense matters between the legislative and executive branches."35 Or as this
constitutional structure is called, checks and balances. Accordingly, the Founders gave the
authority to declare war, the power to raise and equip armed forces, and the making of
rules and regulations for those forces, to the elected Congress. They granted to the
executive (the civil government) the power to conduct war, and assigned to the President
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of the United States and supreme civilian authority the role of the Commander-in-Chief of
the armed forces. 36 This constitutional structure of checks and balances prevents the
centralized control over the armed forces, meaning that the command of the armed forces
and ability to pay for their services are not concentrated in the same hand.
'Thus, the framers separated power over the military, just as they had in so many
other areas of government. The two great powers, the purse and the sword, the latter the
most direct threat to liberty, were separated, but at the same time shared by the two
branches. Each, by exercising its authority over the armed forces, checked the other's
capacity to use those forces against the state. Under the constitutional structure, no army
could seize power or become the tool for a coup without shattering the Constitution and
with it, legitimate government altogether."
37
Beside the constitutional provisions it depends on the civil society, political society
and the state to what extent these provisions will be implemented. The implementation is
key to the attainment of democratic control over the armed forces.
1. Civil Society
'Democracy is about the open contestation of power via elections and the
oversight and control of state power by the representatives of people."3 ' One of the basic
aspects of state power is the military. Therefore, in a democracy civil society must
consider how it can make a contribution to the democratic control of the military and
intelligence system. It requires from the civilian side a special kind of approach to the
military, meaning first mutual respect and second mutual expertise in each others' areas.
The civilians must be competent in military issues and vice versa. In order to make the
right evaluation of military issues, they must be considered more with the justification of
military expenses, which goes beyond the Simple" process of allocation of financial
resources for military purposes. This civil competence is achievable through various








branch, but this might raise the issue of confidence. Another solution might be the civilian
attendance at National Defense Universities.
39 But in this case the civilians will probably
play a passive role by absorbing the views offered by military experts and scientists. In a
more distant stage of democratic transition and consolidation, one or more civilian-led
independent research institutions can be established that concentrate on international
military politics. 'The creation of such prestigious, independent, and civilian-led institutes
- and comparable journals - would seem to be high on the agenda of civil society."40
These institutes aim at continued professional development of a cadre of citizens who are
masters in their knowledge of the force structure, organizational style, budgetary issues,
doctrinal questions, and the specific details of weapon systems that are indispensable for
the fulfillment of the military and intelligence oversight functions of political society,
especially in the legislative branch.
This expertise is useful for the civilian executive authority in formulating
constitutional provisions on the military establishment. Furthermore, they can significantly
contribute to the crafting of laws and decrees, such as security and defense policy
principles, service laws and laws on the status of different military personnel.
2. Political Society
Democratic forms of governance facilitate 'the establishment of permanent
standing committees in the legislature, or in party-based parliamentary cabinets, which
have the obligation of routine oversight and monitoring of the country's military and
intelligence organizations"
41
. These committees generally enjoy more freedom in selecting
professional staffs specialized in the issues of military strategy, budgeting, and
intelligence. Often the representatives of these committees are drawn from the ranks of
both the professional civil service and from the political parties. The Defense Committee
of the Parliament is an important stage in conveying or channeling professional needs of










executive authority. Active and professional military approaches in promoting military
interests can provide benefits. Standing defense committees offer a stable portfolio (a
place for organized lobby) in this respect. On the other hand, self-empowerment of
legislative in national security matters through parliamentary defense committees is both
politically necessary and politically possible.
'Political society could do more to empower itself to help create a model of
democratic professionalism that would strive to reduce military autonomy and
prerogatives. Such a model needs a base in the values, geopolitical perspectives, and
technical capabilities concerning military affairs in civil society."43
3. The State
The interests of the state suggest the expansion of the range of people and
institutions in civil and political society with a deep knowledge and concern about national
defense and military affairs. It helps to enrich the ideological, technical, and organizational
resources democratic governments can call upon when they come into office.44 Following
the democratic changes the state must ensure that there are certain areas, such as the
economy, or issues of human rights where the military must not intervene. Generally, the
military should not have a vehicle in internal policy. If the military is involved in the
management of internal conflict, this situation also represents threats to military hierarchy
because of the tendency of certain military components most involved in repression and
intelligence activity to become independent, and for military attention to professional tasks
to be neglected.45 Consequently, the basic formula of civilian supremacy and military
professionalism is the most desirable and must prevail in any circumstances.
In the process of transition to a democratic society the executive authority can
behave in a passive or active manner.
46
If it is passive, it means that any initial effort in the
new democratic regime to 'reprofessionalize" the military would be led by the military










and fails to play a leading role in formulating and implementing an alternative model of
civil-military relations, it would be in early conflict with the military. In the opposite case,
where the executive is actively involved in all the transitional issues, and attempts to
increase military professional capacities and lessen the risks of further military
intervention, the process of democratization will not be derailed.
B. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AS A MUTUAL PROCESS OF
ACCOMMODATION: THE EXPERIENCE OF HUNGARY
'The development of civil-military relations is a dynamic process in which
problems are managed but are never solved , in the definitive sense of the term. Even in a
mature democracy, the stability of civil-military relationship is not a given that can be
taken for granted."
47 In this relationship, too, conflicts constantly re-emerge, which
makes democratic control a permanent "issue" in society."48
This is why establishing civil-military relations in a transition period has a
uniqueness in two aspects. First, developing a new type (democratic) of civil-military
relations in transition is a new feature in the institutional structure of an emerging state,
since such an issue supposedly had never been on the agenda in the previous regime. 'The
idea that the military should be placed under strict civilian control is new to most of
Central and Eastern Europe."49 Second, adequate formulation and legislation of this issue
can mark a stable beginning for this relationship defining the basis for civil-military
cooperation for a long period to come. The failure in doing so, ultimately can undermine
successes achieved in institutional engineering and can lead to the collapse of an
unconsolidated democratic structure, and make the whole democratic process reversible.
So, double responsibility rests on the shoulders of each ofthe players, civilian and military,
involved in establishing civil-military relations.
Peter M. E. Volten, On Analyzing Civil-Military Relations , research outline manuscript, Center for
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'If civilian rule over the areas of security and national defense is central to any
democracy, it is particularly so to new democracies just emerging from situations in which
the military occupied prominent position."50 Regardless of the modification of
authoritarian regimes, the armed forces played a central role in maintaining law and order,
suppressing undesirable political forces aiming at overthrowing a particular dictator or the
whole socialist leadership. The use of the military to keep non-democratic leaders or
regimes alive is less inherent to former socialist countries, where the army was not the
only means in helping to suppress. Since the armed forces in former socialist countries
were under strict control on behalf of the Communist Parties, these societies were less
prone to military coups. These militaries were intentionally made incapable of executing
military coups.
1. The Transformation of the Military
'In new democracies the issue of control of institutionalized force is all the more
germane because the question of exclusive areas of competence for the military and the
government is itself a matter of contestation."
51
This argument is applicable in a situation,
when there is a transition from an open or a latent military regime to a higher level of
societal development (democracy), such was the case with some of the Southern
European, Latin American and African countries. But in a transition from a European
socialist (relatively less militarized) to a democratic regime the involvement of the armed
forces in the transition is less significant, since the competition is going on not between the
military and the society, but rather between non-democratic and democratic civilian
political forces. As it has been described above, the socialist regime had other than military
means to sustain the regime itself, such as strong ideology, highly sophisticated secret
police, both within the society and the armed forces. Nevertheless, to assert a certain level
of military involvement in stabilizing the regime would be applicable.
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The Hungarian case suggests that unlike other countries in the Central and Eastern
European region 'the Hungarian army stayed absolutely neutral during the Hungarian
transition. Once again, given Hungary's recent political history, the army calculated that a
passive acceptation of peacefully negotiated change would not hurt its interests"52 Back
in history, whenever a chance appeared to overthrow the socialist regime in any socialist
country a direct military involvement was to be executed by other socialist countries led by
the Soviet Armed Forces. It was the case in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968.
Poland 'managed" to handle the democratic uprising in 1981 by proclaiming the
state of martial law, in this way saving the country from an invasion by East-German,
Czechoslovakian and Soviet troops. Moscow had never intended to use the home army to
restore the regime, but a strong Soviet presence in each former socialist country assured
the 'necessary" remedy in case of emergency. That is why 'in 1956 the [Hungarian]
military either supported the revolution or deserted from the army, but there was no
organized force, which supported the Russian invasion. . . . From the very beginning of the
regime change the demand of the withdrawal of Soviet troops was on the agenda." 53
As it has been said before during the democratic shifts in 1989 the armed forces
remained neutral. In this transition in 1989 'the army's gamble paid off in terms of trust.
In an annual study of citizens' trust in institutions, in every year between 1989 and 1992,
the army ranked the highest ofthe six institutions polled."54
'From the historical and comparative perspective, political society made a further
step toward the capacity to function well in that, unlike the Philippines, Korea, or any
country in Latin America, Hungary selected a pure parliamentary model of government." 55
One more evidence, that in the Hungarian transition the armed forces did not play any
significant role in the political struggles.
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Discussing the concept of civilian supremacy, one has to make a reference to
Samuel Huntington's influential formulation of models of civilian control. 'Huntington
rightly linked civilian control to the minimization of military power, which would allow
civilian authorities effectively to make the military 'the tool of the state"." 56 This control
is based on the maximization of professionalism, which has the consequence of rendering
the armed forces 'politically sterile and neutral". This minimization of the military's
political power is balanced, however, with 'recognition of autonomous military
professionalism ... of an independent military sphere. 57
Talking about political power, in Hungary the Hungarian Round Table agreement
in 1989 did not lead to a power-sharing formula but to direct popular elections of the
Parliament. This fact underlines that the Hungarian military was excluded from any
political power sharing, since the military as a body, and the servicemen are not entitled by
constitutional provisions to run for any political office, and according to military's Service
Law, the members of the armed forces must stay neutral, they cannot be a member of any
political party. But on the other hand, since they are civilians in uniform they have
electoral rights to participate in democratic elections.
According to Vincent T. Maphai; 'Political power is made up of several elements:
economic resources (wealth, skill, productive capacity), coercive power (control of the
army and other security forces), control of the public sector, international standing, and
political legitimacy as evidenced by electoral support." 58 Considering these prerequisites
for political power with common sense, the armed forces are precluded from political
power. So, it is one more evidence, that the armed forces are not in a position in a
democratic society to have a share of political power.
In contrast to this kind of control (civilian control) stands subjective control, which
presupposes some degree of military involvement 'in institutional, class, and constitutional
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of the state" and by denying 'an independent military sphere." ' In democracy, however,
the degree of military participation can vary only within well-defined limits. Military
participation and influence in government policy-making cannot trespass beyond certain
thresholds that are critical for the maintenance of democratic government." 'The process
of asserting civilian supremacy after authoritarianism normally starts with the gradual
removal of the military from societal concerns to intermediate or institutional concerns."60
In translating these areas of responsibility one can conclude, that the civilian
executive authority has the power to formulate policy on defense and security matters, and
also related areas necessary to implement those political decisions. 'In these activities it
has to rely on military professionalism and expertise. Therefore, representatives of the
military establishment can have great influence in the early stages of the decision-making
process, and their input is significant throughout the whole implementation process. There
they can - and should, if needed - express opposing or critical views in the internal debate
on the main strategic options."61 This process itself presupposes the civilian supremacy as
well.
'Civilian supremacy is reached through a process consisting, first, of the removal
of the military from power positions outside the defense area and, second, of the
appointment and acknowledgment of civilian political superiors in the defense and military
areas."
62
In the socialist system the top military leadership constituted a part of the highest
decision-making and governing political body, the Politburo. In this setting many problems
occurred due to the overlapping areas of responsibilities between civilians and military.
Intervening in each others professional matters (policy-making and professional
implementation), it was impossible to define clearly the domains of responsibilities
,
which
led to a chaotic situation and mutual distrust, especially at power implementation levels,
since the military, who considered themselves professional experts did not favor direct










The top level military leaders, previously involved in policy-making (tasting the
charm of political power) supported the old institutional structures trying to avoid their
own removal from political positions, thus loosing power and prerogatives.
Felipe Aguero argues that 'the attainment of civilian supremacy demands that
proper governmental structures already exist or are in the making which allow for a
pattern of authority in state agencies such that civilians may effectively exert leadership
over the military."
3 Even if the problem of controlling the military almost never existed in
Hungary, the preceding statement is of paramount importance. Unlike other former
socialist countries, Hungary managed even before the beginning of the democratic changes
(approximately by 1987) to make several institutional changes necessary to the transition
process. It made the institutional transition relatively easy, but the existence does not
guarantee the proper functioning of democracy as a system. The interagency processes are
likely to play an important role in this process. The key element to democracy (general
framework including institutions and procedures) is the democratic constitutional
formulation of all the interests articulated by each of the players in a democratic process.
The Constitution must delineate the division or share of political power on which the
system works. Formulating the constitutional provisions during the political shifts,
'Hungary had amended a Communist-made constitution, rather that creating a new one,
was still a source of political conflicts in 1995."
64 The inadequacy of constitutional
formulation caused a power struggle between the president, the prime minister and the
minister of defense in the early 1990s. The question was 'Who is in the charge of the
armed forces?". 'The new reform intended to put the armed forces under communist
control by relocating the core of the army cadres from the defense ministry to a Hungarian
Army Commander subordinate to the president. As a result of the reform, the president -
who was expected to be communist reformer - became the commander-in-chief of the
army. Whereas in most other parliamentary system a clear line of authority exists from the
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1989 Hungarian defense reform the line of authority went directly from the president to
the Commander of the Hungarian Army to the Chief of Staff, leaving the government
basically out of the chain of command, one unfortunate result of which was increased
tension between the president and the civilian government."
65
'Thus problems and political differences soon escalated into significant tension in
civil-military relations."
66 The problem originated essentially from the relationship between
the military and the ministry of defense. The new defense reform in 1992 had the dual
purpose of subordinating the military command to the defense ministry in accordance with
the Constitutional Court decision and replacing career officers with civilians in order to
strengthen the leading coalition party control over the ministry. The president remained
the commander-in-chief of the armed forces with specific duties and responsibilities which
though defined by the Constitutional Court remained untested. "According to Lajos Fur
(the first minister of defense after the first democratic elections), as of 1 March 1994, the
defense ministry would have three state secretaries: political, administrative, and chief of
staff."
67
This statement demonstrates the need to rely on military advise and expertise
both in political decision-making and policy implementation. The top command echelon of
the armed forces cannot be handled independently, separated from the administrative level
of defense management.
2. Department of Defense
"A department of defense helps empower civilian authorities by providing them
with a unified structure for the conduct of policy and homogenizes the military with the
rest of the state administrative bureaucracy."68 However, 'the presence of civilians in the
defense ministry is not an end in itself. Their introduction into the MOD structure is not a
mere democratic requirement: it also has practical advantages. Civil servants who have
had previous experience in other branches of public administration prior to coming to the
55
Jeffrey Simon, NATO Enlargement and Central Europe. A Study on Civil-Military Relations.








Ministry ofDefense (for instance, Foreign Ministry; Interior or Justice) generally prove to
be better communicators, having more technical skill in inter-agency cooperation."69 In a
democratic, pluralistic array of institutions there is a permanent competition among these
new institutions for status and resources. It is in the interests of the armed forces to have a
defense ministry, which can successfully communicate with Parliament, the Ministry of
Finance, various NGOs, or with the public as a whole, when it wants to gain their support.
"Western experience shows that civilian economists, sociologists and legal and media
experts who also have the necessary knowledge of defense matters can be effective
advocates for the MOD/armed forces."70
Another important aspect is that the Ministry of Defense has to operate in the state
administrative bureaucracy, while its executive organ, the armed forces has to function in
the conditions of market economy. Since, the whole state functions under the conditions
of free market competition, the military cannot be an exception as used to be the case in
the socialist regime, just as most of the sectors of state production. In that time the
military-related businesses enjoyed strong state subsidies. In a market economy, where
free competition prevails, civilian economists, or military economists with sufficient
knowledge of economics can successfully manage the army's needs and its procurement.
Economic issues include defense budgeting, resource allocation and spending. The same
situation is true for the other experts within the defense portfolio.
The following describes a brief situation in MOD after the democratic shifts
started. The first "democratic" civilian defense minister in May 1990 inherited a
numerically and organizationally weak ministry. "The ambition of the new administration
was first, to transform this remnant of the military Ministry into a Ministry of Defense in
line with the model found in Western countries, and second, to reintegrate the Defense
Staff into the Ministry of Defense, also in accordance with the primary goal. The






personnel terms - of the civilian-administrative component of the MOD."
71 The reform
sought a Ministry ofDefense, headed by a civilian politician, that implements the decisions
of the Government with respect to the armed forces through specific military activities of
the (re-incorporated) Chief ofDefense Staff. The Defense Act adopted in December 1993
laid the legal grounds for the reintegration of the Defense Staff into MOD. The
preparatory work started in January 199472, but was stopped in July of the same year,
when the change of administration occurred. This fact shows a fragment of institutional
engineering, how players are trying to gain political influence.
In the model adopted in the early 1990s, the MOD is the locus of 'the very essence
of civil-military relationship between armed forces and society."73 'This is the very crucial
point at which the military meet elected politicians (the minister and the political state
secretary in case ofHungary) and civil servants (from desk officers to the 'administrative
state secretary" and the deputy state secretaries)."
74 Between 1991 and 1994 the
"civilianization" process succeeded in bringing civilians to the MOD to all positions,
including state and understate secretaries, the heads of ministerial departments as well as
the executive assignments. 'Professional training and personnel ability were the essential
qualifications in the 'civilianization" process in the MOD after the political change.
Nevertheless, the leadership of the MOD between 1990 and 1994 failed to make clear
policy decisions on whether it wanted to follow the non-partisan 'civil servant" (for
instance, British) or the 'political appointee" (for instance, US) model in the
'civilianization" of the Ministry. A substantial ambiguity remained in this regard, which
proved to be prejudicial to the success ofthe transition in the first, crucial period."75
However, five years after the Systematic change", the process of "civilianizing"
the ministry is on the whole falling short of the initial hopes of those politicians who
71
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wanted a more dynamic transformation of defense management. The reason for that is, in
1994 a Hungarian Socialist Party - Alliance of Free Democrats coalition that took office
after the electoral victory. A retired colonel was appointed as a minister of defense.
'With the arrival of new administration, relatively few changes were made in the
organizational structure of the Ministry of Defense developed by 1994: a new (fourth)
deputy secretary post was created, which involved an insignificant redistribution of the
supervised areas."
76 Much more substantial were the personnel changes, including all
vice-ministerial posts and the overwhelming majority of the head of the department and
head of the section positions. With two exceptions (the political state secretary and one
deputy state secretary) active or retired two or three-star generals were nominated to the
vice-ministerial-administrative state secretary posts. 'These personnel changes have their
significance not only, and even not primarily in the classic dichotomy of civil-military
relations. This 'remilitarization" of the MOD has signaled a very clear message of
political-ideological restutio in integrum in defense management."77 In response,
Chairman of the National Assembly's Defense Committee, expressed concern about
'militarization" of the defense ministry and noted that there was not enough 'civilian
staff". Jeffrey Simon in his book 'NATO Enlargement and Central Europe, A Study on




suggesting a diversion to a less democratic period of transition in the defense
matters. This development obviously provoked adverse reaction at home (essentially from
the political opposition, the media and some defense intellectuals) and abroad, serious
concern being voiced about the direction of events and the effectiveness of civilian control
ofthe Hungarian military.
'In Hungary, besides the parliamentary reactions already mentioned, think-tanks
and defense intellectuals turned their attention to the risks that 'the neglect of civilian
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within the Government, key officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seem not to be
satisfied with current state of civilian control in Hungary in the light of Euro-Atlantic
requirements. To improve the situation in the MOD another civilian expert, a diplomat
with huge expertise on all democratic affairs, was nominated to a state undersecretary post
in 1996, with the responsibility for Euro-Atlantic integration process, and bilateral and
multilateral international affairs. His presence in the Ministry of Defense seems to
strengthen the civilian oversight of the military administrative bureaucracy, not least with
his major influence on the preparation of political decision making concerning military
matters. This step suggests the importance of the personnel factors, which should not be
excluded in any case in democratic transition and consolidation.
3. Attainment of Civilian Supremacy
Felipe Aguero in his book, Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy, defines the
conditions when 'Civilian Supremacy Attained". But before he concludes 'I will argue,
however, that democratization and civilian supremacy can be secured without prior
voluntary support of the democratic credo by members of the armed forces"80 . 'It means
that you don't have to have a whole bunch of democrats to have democracy." 81
So, the question still remains: 'When can the process of asserting civilian
supremacy be said to be complete?"82 He gives two possible solutions for measuring the
level of adequate civilian supremacy. First, 'to establish a certain period of time after the
end of the transition during which, for instance, the military has abstained from
intervening"
83
. In the case of Hungary this is not the way to go, since as we have already
clarified earlier, by no means the Hungarian military can interfere in civilian political
decision-making. It makes sense to apply the other recommendation given by Aguero, to
verify whether civilian supremacy is attained or not. But before applying the second
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of democratic transition, so, in the current stage of development of the events we are able
to judge only certain achievement and designated directions of further development in the
context of the relations between the civilian and military sides.
Aguero's operational criteria, to judge whether civilian supremacy is attained or
not, combines the time dimension with the following substantive elements of civilian
supremacy:
- some habituation has been reached over a number of years in the exercise of
civilian leadership:
- the prerogatives contemplated in the definition of civilian supremacy have been
formalized in this definition in the nation's constitution or other major laws;
- no overt challenge by the military as institution to civilian authority and the
constitution has taken place over a number of years;
- the military has manifestly had to accept at least one major decision taken by
civilian authorities about which military opposition had been previously voiced. 84
Considering these substantive elements of civilian supremacy Jeffrey Simon in
dealing with civil-military relations of Hungary in the light ofNATO expansion calls his
whole chapter 'Constitutional Challenge and Reform". It means that he considers the
second of Aguero's elements the most critical for the success of the Hungarian democratic
transition. Listing several ambiguities in the procedural implementation of tasks, which
ensure civilian supremacy, he calls attention to the following: Tor Hungary there are
other tasks to achieve effective civilian oversight of the military - to adopt a new
constitution that has broad based national consensus and clarifies some outstanding issues
such as the president's wartime authority. In addition, Hungary needs an interagency
organization (a National Security Council) that could formulate national security policy." 85
Looking for solutions, he defines the main tasks of the Ministry of Defense, which are as
follows:
- ensuring the maintenance of real civilian oversight of the military;
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- implementing a mid-and long term planning mechanism in MOD;
- cultivating civilian specialists into the Ministry ofDefense.
Other major principles of asserting civilian supremacy in postauthoritarian regimes,
are closely tied to the interdependent relationship, which may be seen as a reform of
communication and bargaining. The actors for these interactions are given, namely the
military on the one hand, and the civilians on the other hand. Nobody can argue against a
basic set of circumstances in which 'the start of the transition finds the military and the
civilians holding distinct, often conflicting interests. The military, as with any large
organization, seeks to advance its institutional interests and prerogatives86 . 'On the other
hand, relevant civilian political groups seek the establishment of democracy as an
institutional means of solving conflicts."
For this bargaining both sides pursue interests, which are characterized with
inherent uncertainties and require guarantees. 'For the military, guarantees are those, that
secure its autonomy and protect it from external control. Furthermore, institutional
guarantees for the military are those that prevent outcomes in the political process which
are deemed threatening to the military institution and to its views of national security."8
However, the assertion of civilian supremacy demands that guarantees initially given the
military be reduced, replaced or reformed. 89
Being aware of the assets necessary for bargaining each of the parties involved is
trying to gain as much advantage as possible. But, 'bargaining does not necessarily entail a
formalized situation in which actors explicitly exchange agendas and mutual claims and
demands, although it may very well take this form, and it often has. Bargaining is, rather, a
constant process in which actors signal intentions and brandish resources with a view
producing reactions and responses, which are in turn taken as signals for renewed
interaction"
90















The relative strength depends on the strength of political culture, the strength of
social system, or the degree of political institutionalization. As well as in a stable
democracy political culture presupposes the knowledge of the interests and professional
expertise of the other side. In order to have a 'good bargain", both the military and the
civilian sides are responsible for the possession of that expertise. Of course, even having
them the military must be aware about civilian supremacy and the fact that the bargain on
its side does not pursue political goals.
Due to the lack of this expertise, difficulties emerged in the bargaining process in
Hungary. Difficulties of change on the civilian side included the absence of civilian
expertise on defense and security matters, since the socialist system was characterized by
excessive concern for military secrecy, thus the issues related to military affairs were
simply excluded from public debate. Furthermore, for various reasons of recent or more
distant history, the civil population harbored explicit anti-military feelings and intellectuals
involved in bargaining were not totally exempt from that prejudice. And thirdly, the
concept of civilian control and political neutrality has not always been correctly
understood by the (civilian) politicians ofthe new democracies. 92
Difficulties were observed on the military side as well. For example, the military
had no experience of working with civilians representing opposing (democratic) interests
in the old regime, it lacked the ability to compromise, since it got used to the commands
coming from the highest communist party level. These objective conditions also prevented
both sides from mature bargaining.
There is no doubt, that in this process of bargaining internal unity on both sides
respectively is of utmost importance. Unity for civilian forces is no less important than for
the military. Ultimately, 'civilian coalescence on fundamentals will limit the range of
resistance strategies available to the military"
93
. In the bargaining process the public
usually supports the civilian side, since according to comprehensive strength model; it sets






capture situations in which actors unevenly empower themselves within a shared
institutional setting, itself changing in a period of regime transition."
94
Consequently,
manifest citizen support for emerging civilian structures, leaders, and policies is a deterrent
to forceful action by the military against reforms, as it signals increased costs to
intervention and reduces the military's bargaining power.
Ultimately, 'the goal of asserting civilian supremacy demands that civilian
leadership develop its own conception of national defense accompanied with civilian
expertise. Civilian leaders must develop their own general appreciation of the nation's
security problems and threats and a concordant definition of the goals of national
defense".
95
'More specifically, they must develop policies on the allocation of resources
for national defense and on the relationship that military should establish with the rest of
the state and society."
96
'It is generally the case that civilian leaders have little, if any, command of military
and defense affairs when the transition to democracy begins.
"
s From this statement
Felipe Aguero suggests that the civilians can do a better job, a better bargain when they
have at least some degree of confidence with military. But, one supposes, that civil-
military relations must be immediately in the focus of the state affairs (even if the military
does not pose a significant danger to the new state), since effective control over the armed
forces can give a confidence to state managers in overcoming different problems of the
transition period.
Last but not least, economic factors play a considerable role in the transition
process. Usually, the conditions are more favorable, when a successor government is
economically prepared to cope with different legacies of authoritarianism and with the
eventually growing demands of a resurrected civil society. 'Economic prosperity also
provides flexibility in government's dealings with the military and assists in the satisfaction












As a matter of fact scarce economic conditions can pose a considerable threat to
newly born, still fragile democracies. As a consequence, worsening budgetary conditions
can hamper the smooth development of civil-military relations. Two types of danger can
occur due to unsatisfactory economic conditions. First, on occasion the new political
establishment can make incorrect threat assessments, or might be insensitive to the real
national security needs. This would lead to unsatisfactory defense budget allocations. And
the second, worsening budgetary conditions can 'stimulate the military's reentry into
politics, especially in those cases in which the military, from its governmental experience,
learned about the intractability of problems in this area and of the risks involved in being
placed in the charge of solving them"99
.
It is obvious, that 'the first institutionalized postauthoritarian political
arrangement, then, becomes a factor in itself by shaping the institutions that differentially
empower the civilians and the military for the ensuring process, within which attempts to
attain civilian supremacy and democratic consolidation will take place" 100 . "An important
effect of initial conditions on the post transition process is that they unevenly empower
political actors in their attempts to change or maintain the contours of the first, inaugural
postauthoritarian arrangement."
101
However, initial conditions vary country by country.
As the case of Hungary shows, the problems between civilians and the military
were settled in a peaceful way, with the military fully accepting civilian supremacy in the
transition period and thereafter. For Hungary the constitutional arrangements constituted
and continue to constitute a challenge in solving the political disputes on the domination
over the armed forces. 'In the future more attention should be focused on specific
arrangements of democratic defense management, in other words how the ministry of
defense is organized, how relationship between Parliament, the MOD and the High











As a general conclusion: 'institutional settings and resources provide the
constraints but also the opportunities, and it is up to the actors involved to utilize, exploit,
or avoid them" 103 .
C. SENIOR MILITARY LEADERS IN THE POLITICAL DECISION-
MAKING PROCESS
Different democratic countries have developed various force structures, and these
structures are subject to constant development. 'In democracy, where civilian supremacy
is to prevail in defense and military matters, firm constitutional guarantees protect the state
- and also the armed forces - from two types of potential dangers: from politicians who
have military ambitions, or who would like to use or misuse the military to attain political
goals, and from serving military men with political ambitions."
104
Objective civilian control over the military keeps both sides from these potential dangers.
Civil-military relations themselves presuppose the existence of two sides: civilian and
military. Ifboth sides are decentralized the probability for military intervention into politics
or political intervention into professional military matters is very low. As it has been stated
above, proper constitutional and institutional structures are to ensure the military's proper
role in the society.
If one assumes a situation in which the military is highly centralized, and one of the
political players possesses increased centralization of authority over the military, the
possibility of misusing the armed forces increases. Since the constitutional and legislative
structures can prevent the danger on the civilian side, the civilian authority must create a
proper command structure of the military through which high level centralization of the
services can be avoided.
In the political decision-making process direct military involvement is undesirable.
However, the military may come into the picture in selecting strategic missions for the






during the implementation of political decisions as the only professional side concerned.
The objective of the civilian side is to involve the military in the whole decision-making
process as late as possible, while the military side is trying to ensure the favorable outcome
of all political decisions in military matters.
A widely accepted structure of the armed forces is the existence of separate
services with a structure of Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the United States, this structure is
further developed with the existing position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The reason for this is that separate services cannot wage wars independently, joint military
operations are at the forefront of modern warfare, which was clearly demonstrated in the
operations during W.W.II. 'Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever, said
President Eisenhower. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all
elements, with all services, in one single concentrated effort." 105 So, the roots of this
approach and structures go back to at least the late- 1950s. The organization of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, however, does not presuppose unconditional agreement and consensus
among the services. 'Their achievements had been great; but there had been failures, too,
and the weakness of the group was that, despite himself, each member had been caught by
fears and ambitions of service prestige and made advocate of special, instead of national,
interests."
106
Should a case occur when the Joint Chiefs of Staff create a highly professional
joint military force capable of overthrowing the country's civilian leadership, the whole
democratic regime would be in serious danger. This is a situation the civilian side wants to
avoid. At the same time, it is a natural reaction of the civilians in civil-military relations to
try to avoid direct interaction with the services' Chiefs of Staff representing real and
unfiltered military needs. It is a much more preferable solution for civilians to create the
organization of Joint Chiefs of Staff, in which separate services have to arrive at common
decisions on all issues presented to higher civilian levels. The probability of a balanced
105
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outcome is much higher than in the case when separate services could promote their own
interests.
The role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is very unique, although,
according to the law, the Chairman is one among equals within the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
One must consider this appointment as one more guarantee for avoiding sharp
confrontation between the military and civilian sides. Though the Chairman is one among
equals, he is different from the Joint Chiefs in important ways.
107
Since he is the senior
military officer, he represents the regular military link to the Secretary of Defense, the
President, and the National Security Council. He is the only serviceman who testifies
before Congress on defense issues. Another important aspect of his assignment is that he
has no service responsibility, thus he can treat interservice issues strictly and fairly and he
can advise on the resolution of interservice differences, being at the same time both
outsider and insider of all military issues. He can and must stay neutral regardless of his
service assignments in the past and his service affiliation.
By the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which intended to
improve the advice to civilian leadership among others, the Chairman is authorized to
formulate military advice without consulting the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
by permitting him to consult them as he considers appropriate.
One should argue that in fulfilling his assignment, the Chairman's activity involves both
professional and political aspects. It depends on the personality of the Chairman as to how
he can find the balance between these two areas or how the focus of his activity can be
shifted to one or the other direction, but most probably toward political decision-making.
Given the objective circumstances, the Chairman has to work under the requirements of
timeliness and security, he has deal with sensitive issues. 'Many of these not only involve
complex military factors, but become inextricably interwoven with political factors. They
often touch on matters so sensitive that the chairman will not risk revealing them to a
group as large as the joint staff, particularly with its routine involvement of the service
37
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staffs in its preparations of joint positions." 108 Therefore, in dealing with issues which
have definite consequences in the political decision-making process, the Chairman simply
can not ignore considering the political aspects of his advice, he has to weigh to the
certain extent the political factors as well. In this way, the human factor, and first of all
the sense of responsibility, in preparing political decisions is in the focus in the chairman's
activity.
D. CONCLUSIONS
The transitional process to democracy has to address different political and societal
issues. When the change of the regime involves the establishment of democracy the fate of
the military is of utmost importance, because soldiers might well demonstrate the
strongest resistance to democratic changes. The armed forces will try to preserve as many
prerogatives obtained under the previous regime as possible. They will not voluntarily
give up any of them. Moreover, they will try to find an ally in the political system who can
guarantee these advantages in the future. In the military establishment the high ranking
officials potentially have the most to lose, that is why they constantly strive for political
support. The head of the professional military is a key person in this play since he has
access to both sides in the interaction between the military and the civilian side.
In the bargaining process it is up to the civilians to what extent they can convince
the military about the necessity of objective civilian control over the armed forces. Taking
an active approach in formulating constitutional and institutional provisions the civilian
side can create favorable conditions for developing productive civil-military relations,
which might serve as a guarantee for the success of democratic transition and
consolidation. Besides, interagency processes should be improved.
In countries where the establishment of civil-military relations is a new challenge
for the entire society, double responsibility rests on each citizen because the success or
failure in doing so will determine the strategic outcomes of democratic societies.
It is evident, that 'the first institutionalized postauthoritarian political arrangement,




civilians and the military for the ensuring process, within which attempts to attain civilian
supremacy and democratic consolidation will take place"
109
. "An important effect of initial
conditions on the post transition process is that they unevenly empower political actors in
their attempts to change or maintain the contours of the first, inaugural postauthoritarian
arrangement."
110
However, initial conditions vary country by country.
As the case of Hungary shows, the problems between civilians and the military
were settled in a peaceful way, with the military fully accepting civilian supremacy in the
transition period and after that. For Hungary the constitutional arrangements constituted
and continue to constitute a challenge in solving the political disputes on the domination
over the armed forces. 'In the future more attention should be focused on specific
arrangements of democratic defense management, in other words how the ministry of
defense is organized, how relationship between Parliament, the MOD and the High










m. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CENTRAL U.S. DEFENSE MANAGEMENT
'The United States was born in an act of violence. The political Declaration of
Independence was not to come for another year and more; but it was the yokels at
Concord Bridge who forced the issue, and if they had not applied their trigger fingers to
their flintlock muskets on that April day it might never have come at all." 112
Due to this revolutionary beginning of statecraft considerable attention should be
given to the military factor in the establishment and development of the American
institutions.
113
Briefly it means that the United States military history constitutes an
integral part of American history and it can be put in its broader context without its
exaggeration.
The direct link between military history and history in general of a given country
does not have to be proved. The difference among various countries might be perceived
on the basis how significantly shaped the military history the historical evolution of a
particular nation. Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski suggest that 'six major themes
place United States military history within the broad context of American history" 114 . A
short overview of these themes might be justified in relation to any country, even though
some of them exclusively relate to the United States, while the rest is of general
consideration. Doing so, it can promote the understanding of the basic characteristics of
the central U.S. defense management.
The first theme is that 'rational military considerations alone have rarely shaped
military policies and programs. The political system and societal values have imposed
constraints on defense matters."
115
Different inherent trends in the society, such as private
gain, a reluctance to pay taxes, a distaste for military service, and a fear of large standing
forces have imposed limitations on financial and human resources, allocated for the
military. This theme is relevant to any society.
112
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'Second, American defense policy has traditionally been built upon pluralistic
military institutions, most noticeably a mixed force of professionals and citizen
soldiers."
116
This is mostly an American tendency, which reflects the diverse attitude of
the society to state-sponsored force in the nation's life.
'Third, despite the popular belief that the United States has generally been
unprepared for war, policy -makers have done remarkably well in preserving the nation's
security."
117
There are certain principles, which are to promote U.S. security, such as
keeping geographic distance from potential enemies, the European balance of power, and
vast mobilization potential. Another issue is based upon the requirements for mobilization.
There are two possible solutions, a) devoting resources to internal development, and then
after the outbreak of war quick mobilization of resources, and b) maintaining a large and
expensive peacetime military. Democracies have other priorities in peace, such as
commerce and consolidation, thus preparations for war are regarded as a waste. However,
due to global responsibilities the United States found the solution somewhere in between
the two proposed solution.
'Fourth, the nation's firm commitment to civilian control of military policy
requires careful attention to civil-military relations."
118
This domain is of great
significance to understand defense reorganization acts, especially in the second half of the
20th century, because this commitment to civilian control makes military policy an
important function of the federal government, where the executive branch and Congress
vie to shape policy.
'Fifth, the armed forces have become progressively more nationalized and
professionalized."
119
This is another vital aspect, because the professionalization of the
officer corps has had crucial consequences for the conduct of military affairs, shaping
civil-military relations, since career officers in the national service occupy high command













industrialization has shaped the way the nation has fought." 120 'This
dependence upon industry and technology in executing military policy has placed
enormous burdens on career officers and defense industry complex." 121 This last theme is
most relevant to the United States, but should be taken into account with the technical
development of industry in other countries as well.
The understanding of these themes and their applications is helpful in tracing the
development of the U.S. defense establishment. On the other hand, from studying the
United States case is beneficial to any country, even though there are certain themes,
which are relevant only to the United States due historical binding conditions.
Nevertheless, there are other issues, which will be relevant to particular countries after
they reach a definite level of democratic development and will have to face the same
problems
,
the United States did a hundred, fifty, or even ten years ago. The U.S. case
should be more relevant to Hungary, because the country has chosen the American model
to structure its standing military force.
A. PRINCIPLES OF SERVICE SEPARATISM UNTIL THE NATIONAL
SECURITY ACT OF 1947
'[T]he American military establishment embodies a tradition of service separatism,
one that has been renewed and reinforced by patterns and paradigms of thought that stress
the decisive effect of military force on the land, at sea, or in the air." 122 The basis for
service separation was laid down by the Constitution of the United States of America in
the late 18th century. The Constitution describes the Congress's powers (including the
power 'To make all Laws ... necessary and proper to carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers'), among which eleven related explicitly to security. The provisions
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'To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of money to that Use shall be
for a longer term than two years;"
123
and
"To provide and maintain a Navy;"
124
"Although these traditions, the natural result of historical circumstance and
political choice, have on the whole served the nation well, they inevitably complicate the
problem of command and control in an age of global missions and technological
uncertainty."
125
In the 18th and 19th centuries both services had similar mission
objectives; to defend the continental area of the United States. 'The Navy's customary
functions had always included protection of American maritime interests in peacetime and
defense ofthe nation's harbors and coasts during war; ... "
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In 1890, Alfred Thayer Mahan's book, Philosophy of Sea Power was published in
which he presented his philosophy. 'This philosophy was compounded from two distinct,
if related theories. One was a theory of national prosperity and destiny founded upon a
program of mercantilistic imperialism. The other was purely and simply a theory of naval
strategy and defense."
127 Mahan restated 'the capital -ship theory in a clear and forceful
manner at a moment when conditions were unusually propitious for its formal adoption as
the basic doctrine of American naval policy" 128 .
The strategic vision of Alfred Thayer Mahan concerning the US Navy significantly
altered the role of the Navy and gave new doctrines as both descriptive and prescriptive
instruments around which to accomplish a major change in naval policy. Consequently, to
the 'traditional" tasks of the Navy one more mission was added, the third mission - the
projection of American power. 129 This change in the role of Navy led to a division of
supporters of the two services and more significance was attached to the Navy. The Navy
had a strong lobby in the Congress, which aimed at the appropriation of necessary funds
sometimes to the detriment of the Army. 'For the first time since 1875, a Republican
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administration had clear Republican majorities in both branches of Congress. And if the
Republican majority in the House was rather slender, it was under the firm hand of the
new speaker, Thomas B. Reed ofMaine, a consistent, if unostentatious, advocate of naval
expansion."
130
Unless separate services are able to accomplish the missions assigned to the
without intervening into each other fields of competence and resources there is a
possibility to manage them isolated one from the other. Nevertheless, to provide necessary
financial resources remains a matter of choice based on preferences and perceptions.
However, if the operational tasks require efforts from each of the services the question of
command and control, unified civilian control comes to the forefront. The appearance of a
new service, for example the air force, can further deepen interservice rivalry and the
problems associated with management of the armed forces and implementation of joint
operations.
'Major efforts to reorganize the US military establishment have recurred
throughout American history, especially since the late nineteenth century." 131 Vincent
Davis explains these efforts mainly on the basis of several circumstances such as: the
gradually expanding international role of the United States; the accelerated pace of
scientific and technological advances, which dictated new strategies, tactics and doctrine
leading to the necessity of new organizational modes; and the fact that 'the military
establishment was frequently a target of more general governmental reform movements
that arose from time to time and that were driven by typically American desires for more




These circumstances have been supplemented by other factors of more immediate
nature with direct consequences. One of these factors is the inequality between the urgent
need to deploy American forces, comprising all services, and the growing external threat.
Suddenly changing international environment between 1898 and 1940 could deny the
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effective deployment of combat ready forces from the United States. Another factor is that
after the transition from wartime conditions to peacetime conditions the management
structures used in war were not adequate to peacetime requirements.
133 Good examples
are the events in 1898, before the Spanish -American War or after W.W.I in 1919. It can
be easily explained by the willingness of the state to provide the necessary defense at the
least possible cost and to put peacetime values ahead of those of wartime after the
termination of military operations in the field. As it can be seen on the example of the
United States, major military reorganizations have taken place in response to anxieties and
criticisms generated shortly before and after war involvement.
134 One immediate
conclusion can be made on the US case; namely, that whenever the circumstances, shaped
by the security environment change the military establishment and its management had to
be changed as well.
In peacetime civilian political decision-makers are inclined to underestimate the
necessity for maintaining a credible military force. On the other hand, military perception
dictates a higher level of military security based on the differences in threat perceptions
and inherent opposition in the military against downsizing.
'Regardless of the circumstances that have led to change, America's military
reorganizations have achieved considerably less than their reformers have hoped for." 13
This fact is due to the reality that most of the parties involved in defense reorganizations
have had hidden agendas, especially the military leaders seeking special benefits for their
separate services. In the case of the United States' armed forces the Air Force and the
Army have been more prone and committed to changes, while the Navy and the Marines
have expressed contradicting arguments. These latter two services are more of the
advocates of service separatism and hoping for more gains and benefits from separately
represented service interests.
"American military reorganization suggests that not much is likely to happen unless








political capital in these efforts during the typical honeymoon period following
inauguration." This observation vindicates the latent political interaction between the
military and civilian sides, based on mutual interests. One would argue however, that
jointness is the enemy of such political, mutually beneficial relationship. When separate
services have to bare in mind joint requirements, first of all they are not so well off with
their own interests. As one shall see in the next chapter the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols
Department ofDefense Reorganization Act is a watershed in these endeavors.
The basic intention of all defense reorganizations which took place in the last
century was centralization. Centralization generally means the creation of a new level of
authority in the organizational hierarchy that reduces the autonomy of the levels below it.
In the 20th century first practical step aiming at defense management reorganization was
taken after the victorious Spanish-American War in 1898-1899, which witnessed
numerous operational shortcomings.
13 To achieve greater cohesion and coordination
within the two armed services, the Navy general board was created in 1900, and the
general staff system was introduced in the Army in 1903. 139 Additionally, to achieve
greater coordination between the services the Army-Navy board was also created in 1903
and functioned as a predecessor of the Joint Chiefs of Staff system, which only emerged
fully four decades later.
The next test of military structures occurred in the period of W.W.I . In order to
bring the Navy structure more similar with the General Staff system of the Army the
Congress established the office of the chief of naval operations (CNO) in 1915. In the
same period, in 1916, President Wilson called the council of national defense into
existence, thus trying to achieve the centralization of military matters at the highest civilian
levels.
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The National Defense Act of 1916 was a product of two trends dominating the
military thinking at the turn of the 20th century, whether the United States should possess
a professional army, or a citizen-soldier army, or the mix of the two. 'tT]he new law was
not really so much less than the Continental Army plan. It retained the National Guard as a
principal military reserve ... . It provided that the land forces of the United States should
consists of four components: the regular army, ... the National Guard, ... a federal reserve
consisting of officers drawn both from former regulars and from the graduates of the
colleges' reserve officer training program and of discharged enlisted men, and a
"Volunteer Army" to be raised only in time of war."
141
'The National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, barely had time to function. When the
United States went to war in the spring of 1917, the army underwent still another
reorganization to form a three-part force: the regular army, the National Guard, and the
National Army. And the new National Army would be raised by conscription." 142 Even
after so many reorganization the remained 'Whether a citizen army, prepared for war in
time of peace, could match good European troops, or whether Emory Upton was right in
contending it could not, had never been settled" 143 .
Like the creation of the 'treaty Navy" in 1919, the postwar reorganization of the
nation's land forces blended the lessons of the world war and more traditional elements of
the military policy. 'The fundamental postwar legislation, the National Defense Act of
1920, created an 'Army of the United States', a force of many parts designed to mobilize
and expand in wartime around a cadre of regulars and part-time soldiers." 144 Enacting this
of legislation, the Congress rejected compulsory service as well as any appreciable
increase in the standing forces. The law, nevertheless, refined the legislation of 1916 in
useful ways and provided a more efficient basis for wartime mobilization than existed in
1917.
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'The Act cut the regular army proposed by General March nearly in half, and it
substituted an avowed reliance on a citizen soldierly. The regular army of 280.000 was to
be organized not on the expansible plan but as an expeditionary force and a gardian of the
outlying territories. The wartime army was to be built principally on the National Guard,
now brought under more federal supervision, at the larger Organized Reserves, the
counterpart of the National Army of 1917." 146
'In 1938 President Roosevelt created the first civilian-military group assigned to
undertake military planning at the highest level of government." 147 The so called Standing
Liaison Committee did not succeed in its work until the President, similarly to President
Wilson vested the major tasks of military planning in the uniformed personnel, at the same
time exercising direct control over this activity. Drawing lessons from the mobilization
during W.W.I, a higher level of efficiency was achieved. But military involvement in
economic processes represented a violation of the rules of capitalist economy. In this way
the nations interests in case of another involvement in war contradicted to the expectation
of the American economic system.
'During the 1920's, the Assistant Secretary of War and his associates started to
formulate plans for industrial mobilization."
148
The need for planning industrial
mobilization was advocated by those persons who were involved in industrial mobilization
in W.W.I. In the following years mainly the uniformed military was tasked with planning
functions, and according to the then legislation the President was authorized to control
and utilize national resources during wartime. 149 The first mobilization plan came out in
1930, and was consequently revised four times, in 1930-31, 1933, 1936, and 1939. The
1930-31, 1933 and 1936 Industrial Mobilization Plans were basically similar in their
approach to the concept of superagencies. 150 These agencies were to be created in the
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event of war, because 'the planners consistently held the belief that the regular
departments and agencies were not suited for new and arduous wartime task"
151
.
The first three amended plans 'lacked a coordinating head and depended entirely
upon the President, who will be too busy to coordinate our industrial effort" 152 . The 1939
Plan was different from the previous ones, because it contemplated the creation of a War
Resources Administration, which was to coordinate the activities of the superagencies. 153




During WW II due to changing operational concepts and changing sizes, new
command structures were introduced to assure the uniformed establishment, the fighting
forces themselves, as well as the authority to command the forces through the creation of
the dual office of Commander-in-Chief, in the Navy. The command system in the Army
practically remained unchanged. 'The formal chain of command in effect during World
War II was essentially the same as it had been before: the president acting as commander
in chief, transmitted orders through the secretaries of the War and Navy departments for
execution by the chief of staff of the Army and the chief of naval operations,
respectively."
155
In addition to these changes the most significant structure to emerge in
W.W.E was the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). 156 This body replaced the Joint
Board and provided the focal point for interservice planning and operations. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff had duel function during war operations. First, it was the agency for
American representation in Allied councils of war, and second, embodied the supreme
command of all American forces. There was an attempt by President Roosevelt in 1944 to
find the best formation ofgovernmental and military machinery for the postwar era and set
the stage for the interaction of these bodies. 157 He initiated the State-War-Navy
















organization, since the participating military entities, the armed services pursued different
interests between themselves and between the state in the course ofWWII.
'The search for the ideal military U.S. military establishment in the immediate
aftermath of W.W.II was inevitably a tortured process." 158 The military establishment had
to be readjusted, however, there were many questions unanswered ahead, such as the new
challenges, threats and opportunities, but first of all 'Who is the enemy". On the other
hand most Americans wanted to return to peacetime normalcy, which put additional
pressure on legislation and military planners. 159
B. THE STRUGGLE FOR UNIFICATION UNTIL THE END OF THE
McNAMARA ERA
After the victory of allied forces in WW II, the United States was more than ever
in a quest for a durable central defense management system. '[T]he most acrimonious
issues revolved primary around the question ofwhether to reorganize the separate services
under some type of new centralizing umbrella structure, and reduce service autonomy in
the process."
160
This endeavor was further complicated by the necessity to find a perfect
role and place for aviation units spread through the services. The debate on unification of
the armed forces started in 1 943 and ended with the eventual result; the enactment of the
National Security Act of 1947. 'For almost two years (1945-1947) two coalitions of
defense reorganizes battled until Truman and Congress, exhausted by the struggle and
anxious about Russia, forged the National Security Act of 1947, the fundamental
legislation of postwar organization. In the balance, the law represented a Navy victory." 161
Defense experts claim that the National Security Act of 1947 was the most
significant piece of defense legislation in the modern history of US military establishment.
"The National Security Act major provisions included:
- The establishment of a cabinet-level Department of National Defense, which two
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- The creation of the United States Air Force
- With the 1949 amendments to the act, the elimination of the War and Navy
departments as cabinet-level agencies, their subordination to a common secretary, and
their reduction to a coordinate status now shared with the Air Force
- The delineation of the principal functions of each of the armed services
- The legislative recognition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who were to coordinate,
but not command, the armed forces
- The establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security
Council162
Comparing the armed services, the U.S. Air Force was the major beneficiary
because it achieved its desired goal, to become a separate service. The other three services
retained equivalent degrees of autonomy, both the Navy and Marines kept their aviation
units.
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The historical struggle for independent air service, led at that time by Brigadier
General B. G. Mitchell, goes back to W.W.I. 'The airplane challenged traditional
definitions of Army and Navy doctrine and functions and stimulated complex patterns of
interservice cooperation and conflict. It also set off sharp internal power struggles with
both the Army and Navy, consumed scarce personnel and funds that otherwise would have
gone to the land army and service fleet ... ." 164 Although, '[t]he War and Navy
Departments did not ignore military aviation" 165
,
the Army-Navy Joint Board established
in 1919 'rejected the radical notion (associated especially with Mitchell) that air power
might win wars" 166 . Instead of establishing independent air service, both the Army and
Navy created separate air units within their respective services. In 1923 a special
Congressional investigatory committee reviewed air policy, but did not find justification












Mitchell who convicted the services for their ignorance lost his battle for independent air
force and left the Army in 1926 rather than be suspended from duty. 167
The outstanding capabilities of the air force were demonstrated in WW. II. Not
only the incredible growth in number, but operational significance of the airplane forced
the Army and Navy to realize the necessity for independent air force. 'Army Field Service
Regulation 100-20, issued on July 21, 1943, was a watershed in air power doctrine. It
began with the statement that 'land power and air power are co-equal and independent
forces; neither is an auxiliary of the other"." 168 The necessary command adjustment to
operate the air forces independently were made and 'the system reached its highest stage
of development during the Normandy invasion and the subsequent campaign for the
liberation of Europe" 169 . The Tactical Air Command, established in July 1944, provided
smooth air and ground operations. The Germans confessed that 'tt]he enemy air activity is
terrific, and smothers almost every one of our movement" 170 .
Although, the NSA of 1947 created the unified establishment much desired by
reformers since the latter part of the 19th century, the troubling issues, however, of
service autonomy were not resolved. According to Harry Howe Ransom's opinion; 'fcince
World War II, interservice rivalry has been the prime characteristic of the defense
establishment. With all of the reorganizations since World War II ... the defense structure
continues to resemble an alliance of semi-independent, sovereign units, often engaged in
bitter jurisdictional warfare." 171 'fT]he existence of 'characteristic' interservice rivalry
was merely the outward manifestation of service autonomy that, although redirected by
National Security Act of 1947, was by no means eliminated."
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As a continuation of interservice rivalry, the late 1940s were still characterized by
the conflict of roles and missions. In drafting the 1951 defense budget Louis Johnson,
successor of Forestall, delivered a deathblow at naval aviation by canceling the
supercarrier project, cutting the active carrier force from eight to four, and reducing
carrier air groups from fourteen to six. The answer of the Navy was 'the revolt of the
admirals"
173
. In 1949 the Air Force and the partisans, both in uniform and mufti, used the
Congress to conduct an erratic, bad-tempered review of defense policy and organizations.
The actual result was an administration victory for its nuclear strategy and low defense
budget.
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The Navy's attempt to discredit the B-36 bomber program foundered. The
Navy lost the battle against the Army and Air Force and the Secretary ofNavy resigned in
protest. Johnson removed Chief of Naval Operations Louis E. Denfeld retaliation for the
CNO's aggressive political offensive against the B-36. 'The revolt of the admirals"
contributed to a consensus, that the military establishment needed an overhaul, and the
1 7^
power of the Secretary ofDefense need to be strengthened.
The leading principle of defense reorganization - centralization - promoted general
unification of the defense establishment, but on the other hand as a non-voluntary move on
behalf of the services created centers for institutional resistance.
176
So, the law of 1947
marked the beginning of an institutional struggle between the civilian and the military
sides. The law of 1947 was amended three times, in 1949, 1953 and 1958. 'These changes
were aimed primarily at strengthening the centralized entities on the civilian side of the
Pentagon, starting with the creation of the department of defense (DOD) itself in the 1949
amendments, the provisions for an expanded bureaucracy within the office of the secretary
of defense (OSD) to support the secretary (SECDEF), and a set of substantially greater
authorities entrusted to the SECDEF in the 1958 amendments." 177 The then incumbent
SECDEF Gates started to exercise the power provided by this legislation, but his
successor Secretary McNamara fully exploited it. 178
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What concerns the development of events on the military professional side, it can
be said that the period between the late 1940s and early 1960s witnessed a gradual
decrease in military professionalism by downgrading the separate services and adding little
support to the relatively weak Joint Chief of Staff mechanism. 179 In addition, the service
secretaries were removed from cabinet status by the mid-1960s thus losing the influence
on political decision-making and budget appropriation. 180 They became a guarantee for
implementing political decisions on the level of the separate services. Accordingly, in this
period the key players in political decision-making came to existence, but the military who
may have some influence on these political decisions was overwhelmed by the civilian side.
The Korean War, which started in June 1950 showed the deficiencies of the
political decision-making system under crisis conditions. First of all, it was the struggle
about the definition of strategy, missions of the services, nuclear weapons and the
consequences of their possible use, in case they really can serve strategic ideas. The
Korean War, which was a limited war of a new type, showed the controversy between
political and military objectives associated with limited warfare. US military
professionalism was not sufficient to deal fully with limited war. The price for American
unpreparedness to fight a less than total war was a strategic improvisation.
'The Korean War demonstrated rather convincingly, however, that despite the fact
that the principle of civilian control is enshrined in the Constitution, enacted in legislative
statutes, and reflected in the administrative organization of the federal government, civilian
1 521
supremacy can not be guaranteed by these formal and legalistic supremacy alone."
One of the prerequisites for a smoothly functioning political decision-making
system is the existence of a real and feasible political strategy. In the absence of this
strategy the civil-military relations are rather ambiguous, in which civilians are stubbornly
insisting on their supremacy in defining strategic objectives, and the military side is missing
the political reference point it would adjust his military professional skills. Similar scenario
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'The United States nuclear policy-making during the missile gap period has
concentrated on four policy areas: threat assessment, national and nuclear strategy,
defense budgeting, and force planning."
182
Presidential power varies across these policy
areas due to three variables, a.) the constitutional distribution of power in the policy arena
between the President and Congress, which increases the requirements and opportunities
for bargaining; b.) the complexity of the issue, because complex issues may encourage the
president's dependence on others for special expertise, technical information or analysis;
c.) the degree to which presidents depend on others to implement their policies faithfully,
since the nature of the decision and the type of behavior desired can either aggravate or
mitigate problems.
The national strategy making was concentrated in the National Security Council
and was dominated by Eisenhower. Given the nature that the nuclear strategy was not
subjected to congressional examination, Eisenhower in formulating nuclear strategy
depended on specialized analyses of nuclear warfare by the armed services. The military's
resistance to production of the information ultimately obstructed and delayed nuclear
strategy decision-making throughout 1958 and 1959. 184 'Thus, nuclear strategy is a classic
example of presidential power in foreign policy making: freedom from congressional
restraints but dependence on the bureaucracy for information critical for making decisions,
and for faithful implementation." 185 So, this is a clear evidence that the military de facto
capable of influencing political decisions based on its special expertise in threat assessment
and expertise on weapon systems of strategic importance. Another phenomenon
dominating this event is the presidential role in political decision-making, which proved to
be crucial in the following two decades.
With the enactment of the 1958 amendments the secretary of defense by gaining
more power became the direct superior of the unified and specified commanders. At the
same time the service chiefs 'Were reduced to being the 'providers and maintainers' of
82










. The unified and specified commanders were fully isolated from policy
formation, they were responsible for the implementation of political decisions. However,
the JCS, on request, could give advice to decision-makers. Thus, the primary intent born
at the time when the National Security Act of 1947 was passed; namely, that those
responsible for carrying out a policy should have a voice in framing it, lost its ground. 187
Civilian decision-makers define the policy first, than the type of the mission
necessary for policy implementation. Than, once the mission is articulated the human and
material resources need to be appropriated. That means that the military wants personal
strength and weapon system to fight with. Even if the military is loosing influence on the
political decision-making process it is inherently trying to keep the prerogatives to justify
the necessary amount ofmoney to buy the military hardware which are on its wish list. So,
this is the very last domain the military does not want to give up.
However, after Secretary of Defense McNamara occupied his office, he still
believed that the military budget was largely administered by the services. 188 'One of the
most important aspects of service autonomy continued to be the effective control of the
Army, the Navy and the Air Force exercised over their budgets and programs." 189 Relying
on the power provided by the 1958 amendments to the National Security Act McNamara
gradually started to exercise total control over budget related issues. First, he scrutinized
the defense budget or forced critical cuts on selected programs, than he introduced the
planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS), thus gaining full control over
defense policy. 'McNamara demanded that defense budgets be organized by functions like
strategic deterrence rather than 'inputs" like manpower procurement." 19° With the
introduction of the PPBS system Secretary McNamara recast the budget process, and
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calculations, or the predicted increase in military capability for different levels of
191
investment.
'McNamara's 'revolution' in the Pentagon gave the strategy of 'Flexible
Response" a life that outlived Kennedy, for it brought such disarray to the armed forces
and Congress that it took another war and a decade of learning and political infighting to
devalue its assumptions."
192
'In practice, OSD, in collaboration with the NSC staff,
challenged the State Department as the primary agency in determining American Policy
whenever that policy appeared to have military significance." 193 'There was no question
that the OSD civilian hierarchy gained new bureaucratic strength, and it is largely correct
that the overall JCS apparatus, in comparison to the growing clout on the civilian side
within the OSD, remained generally weak and ineffective." 194
But despite these harsh legislative measures, the military chose the tactics of silent
resistance and never surrendered to McNamara. The military services manifested their
grievances toward the end of McNamara era (1967-1968), when he lost credibility
because of the Vietnam War. 195 Another evidence of the military's unwillingness to accept
these reforms is given by C. Kenneth Allard, who states 'However much secretaries of
defense such as Robert McNamara scrutinized the defense budget or forced critical cuts
on selected programs, the bottom line always was that it was the generals and admirals
who not only drew up the basic document but defended and justified it throughout each
phase of congressional appropriations process" 196 .
C DEFICIENCIES IN POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING UNTIL 1980
The period starting with 1967 till the middle of the 1970s is marked by a shift in
political decision-making. Among the three major players (the President, the SECDEF,
and the Chairman of JCS) there was a change in influencing or virtually making political














involvement of the President in determining policy objectives especially in the light of the
Vietnam War, largely backed up by the communist world on the other side. As the
practice shows when issues of strategy are at stake it is the President who has to take
personal responsibility. It can lead to biases and subjectivity in formulating strategic
objectives, and consequently unstable objectives can cause imbalance in the national
military strategy as well. "At no time since 1950 had international developments been
more out of balance with American military capability." 197 The political accommodation
of the Vietnam War designed by the Nixon administration turned into an avalanche of
defense policy changes.
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At the same time, on the defense establishment's side the changes brought Melvin
Laird to the OSD. He explicitly reversed McNamara's denigration of professional military
influence, although defense experts claim, that Laird's publicized decentralization back
toward stronger roles for the high-ranking military leaders was considerably less than he
announced. 199 Even so, the military's voice of dissatisfaction was a continuing
phenomenon from the later 1960s until it reached a new zenith in Secretary Weinberger's
tenure under the administration of Ronald Reagen. 'The professional officers sometimes
used the JCS mechanism as their chosen instrument in asserting their positions, creating
the mistaken impression that the JCS itself was gaining a stronger voice. In fact, it was
ordinarily the separate services speaking through the JCS microphone."200
'The Nixon administration and Congress created a fog of distrust and
recrimination that contributed to the decline of military security."201 President Nixon
delegated much of his presidential authority to Henry A. Kissinger, his assistant for
national security policy, who used this authority 'to dominate all the important
intergovernmental committees created by his NSC staff and then became the Secretary of
State as well"
202
. Henry Kissinger ignored his counterparts in OSD and did nothing to
improve relations with the Congress, believed that through personal and tactful diplomacy
197












he was able to manage ambiguous defense policy developments. 'Most importantly,
Kissinger accepted what he believed to be an inevitable decline of American strength,
which could only be moderated by clever personal diplomacy."
Nevertheless, one can assume that some functional deficiencies exist in national
security policy-making in this situation if one individual can dominate the policy-making
process, regardless of his outstanding personal qualities. The danger of uncontrolled
subjectivity should always be restricted if not excluded from security policy issues.
After the resignation of President Nixon in 1974, the new President Gerald Ford,
inherited an unstable presidency and defense policy. And what concerns national military




Another indicator of the state of uncertainty in defense policy matters was the fact,
that under President Nixon and Ford four different Secretaries ofDefense were appointed.
After all these failures the disillusioned legislation asserted its influence on national
security policy by exercising its 'jsower of the purse". When White House agreed to hold
defense spending at a permanent level, the Congress actually approved a 37 percent
decline in military spending in 1968-1 974. 205 Moreover, the Congress by enacting the
Budget and Impoundment Control Act in 1974, and the War Powers Act in 1973 further
weakened presidential authority to manage federal spending and troop deployment
abroad.
206
Standing committees concerned with foreign policy intervened more often in
military policy. Ultimately it led to the situation, in which the military services whether
united through the JCS mechanism or representing separate service interests had almost
no voice and influence in formulating defense and security policy objectives.
'Within the volatile political environment, the Nixon administration gave special
attention to shoring up nuclear strategic stability with the Soviet Union through force












strategic balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union after the implementation of new
Soviet nuclear programs was worrisome. The Nixon administration tried to cap the
nuclear arms competition with the Soviet Union with two treaties signed in May 1972,
however, the treaties did nothing more than provided a temporary modification of the
arms competition.
The important incentives for the right security strategy derived from the
development of nuclear warfare. While '[t]he 1950s were a decade of strategic thought;




'the nuclear age had worked upon the idea of military strategy by arguing that
since the nuclear weapons had made the destruction of the enemy too literally possible, the
principal aim of strategy had shifted from destroying the enemy to hurting him, enough to
coerce him."
209
The objective circumstances, such as overwhelming threat from the Soviet Union,
dramatic change in manpower policy between 1971-1973, and shrinking defense budget
has almost diminished the military influence on decision-making. The most significant
reason for that is of course the reduced defense budget for the armed forces. At this time
all the resources had to be directed for nuclear attack and defense capabilities, since the
Soviet Union was ahead in the nuclear arms race. The necessity for unity of effort
temporarily vanished interservice rivalry. The other reasons with heavy financial
consequences derived from the emerging manpower policy. All volunteer force at its
introduction required substantial spending on servicemen.
The technological modernization of the military's equipment and munitions did not
compensate for the weakened manpower situation. 'Caught between the hammer of
manpower costs and the anvil of procurement, the military had little choice but to reduce
its spending for operations and maintenance."210 Consequently, I argue that the military is
less able to effect political decisions and the services can devote much less energy to the
208
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protection of their service interests when the budget cuttings force them to significantly
reduce the spending on operations and maintenance.
D. CONCLUSIONS
The high road of military organization reform gradually came to an end in the mid-
1960s. In the period between the Senator Henry Jackson preparedness subcommittee's
hearing in 1982 and studies of the late 1950s, the legislative did not make any attempt to
penetrate deeply into military organization issues, and the 1958 amendments were the last
time that the National Security Act was legislatively modified. Naturally, there were many
reports of different study groups advocating the inefficiency of the cold war policy-making
system. 'But the only results were sporadic, quite modest, and incremental changes."
The arena of the JCS was no exception. This body could not perform its role effectively,
since the Joint Chiefs of Staff underwent only relatively little change in their status and
function.
'But at an even higher level, that is, the White House, a variety of developments
occurs that had significant implications for the Department of Defense. Almost all of these
included a greater degree of direct presidential involvement in making policy and strategy,
and, sometimes, even in tactical operational decisions. The foremost development was the
larger and larger role played by the president's national security adviser."212
In practice, "... officials and officers across the river at the Pentagon were free to
play their bureaucratic games against each other; games that the flawed centralization
schemes imposed on the military establishment, from the National Security Act of 1947
until about the time of Secretary McNamara's departure some twenty years later, never
cured"213 . 'The resulting competition for power shaped the evolution of the defense
establishment and mediated the US response to the cold war. External pressures prompted
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IV: ANALYSIS OF THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT
A. INCENTIVES FOR THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT
'How best to balance the unified and separatist approaches to the Department of
Defense has been a challenge that has confronted Congress over the years."215 The forces
that shaped the actual status of the central U.S. management system represent different
interests. First, the separate services that support the independence in general, because
they perceive bigger gains from service separatism, even though, they have to find
Congressional influence and lobby to get a bigger share from defense budget. Second,
Congress that gravitates toward the idea of unification of the services in order to create a
more efficient management system and more importantly a more efficient combat force, by
avoiding duplications and the waste of resources. The question, however, remains what
type of centralized body should be responsible for the separate services, which in no case
should be a General Staff. Since the establishment of the Department of Defense, in 1947,
the Secretaries ofDefense always supported increased centralization authority. Third, '[i]n
attempts to craft the most effective balance between these opposing forces, Congress has
also had to consider a third factor. Increased unification of the U.S. armed forces erodes
congressional control over the military, and Congress has sought to limit that effect by not
overcentralizing authority within the executive branch"
In the historical evolution of the central defense management the first step was the
National Security Act of 1947, which created the position of the Secretary of Defense, but
gave no real authority to him over the secretaries of the separate services. The 1949
amendment of the Law 'represented an important, but limited step in further unifying the
U.S. military establishment"
217
. The Congress intended to put the DOD on the top of the
executive departments of the services. Moreover, the 1949 Amendment provided for a
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who got significant authority as a principal military
adviser to the President, National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense, but he
215






was not to exercise command authority over the military services. 'With the 1949
Amendment to the National Security Act, Congress took a further step toward unifying
the military departments."
218
The following, the 1958 Amendment of the Law gave real authority to the
Secretary of Defense over the military establishment. All the amendments aimed at the
unification of American Armed Forces, but the separate services were still too strong in
resisting effective unification.
One would argue that even though the Reagan administration understood that
security needs require grand budgets, and the Congress accepted the increased defense
spending during the period of 1980-1985, the combined effectiveness of the U.S. armed
forces did not increase proportionally with these huge defense appropriations. However,
several events at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s showed the deficiency in
the defense management system and led to a consensus that the DOD needs
reorganization. Such events were the Iranian hostage crisis in 1979, the Beirut fiasco in
1983, and the operational problems in the Grenada operations, also in 1983.
The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 aimed at the redistribution of power and
institutional roles in the Department of Defense. The reason for this goal was the
phenomenon that both strategy-making and contingency planning were inadequate to
guarantee national security. At the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s different
sources supporting the necessity for change in national (American) policy-and strategy-
making claimed that, '{t]here is all too little systematic strategy-making in the DOD,
except in the strategic nuclear era. Instead, the reality is best characterized as a piecemeal,
irregular, highly informal process, largely driven by cumulative program decisions
influenced more by budget constraints and consequent interservice competition than by
notions ofUS strategic priorities."219 Neither the long-term nor the short-term policy and
strategic planning was adequate and instead of strategic considerations the military was
preoccupied by the adaptation ofnew technology.
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'Technology also seems to drive strategy more than the reverse, particularly in the
nuclear era. In true American style, our services are eager to incorporate advancing
technology into our forces, often without much thought about its strategic impact."22
This meant that the military had no incentives to develop national security strategy. But on
the other hand, other actors responsible for the same strategy allowed flows in the
process, thus, nor the president or the National Security Council produced the necessary
guidelines, which would effectively influence the program process. 221 Just to prove a
complete breakdown in the policy-making system Komer claims that, 'the Defense and
State departments, which should press the White House for such guidance, and make clear
the costs and risks of alternative strategic choices, have usually failed to do so"222 . These
departments rarely had to face up openly to setting regional and functional priorities that
were adjusted to resource constraints. 'Nor has the NSC staff generally shown much
enthusiasm for informing the President on these issues and getting him to require the
departments to perform adequately."
223
Thus, deriving from the above described situation, it is obvious that the whole
policy/strategy-making system, including all the organizations, was responsible for the
inadequate process of national security mechanism.
In this dangerous situation every agency involved in national security issues
believed that the system needed reform. The 'blame' for the breakdown of the system was
put on the Department of Defense by Congress, which at the governmental level is
responsible for the armed forces, since it was not at all difficult publicly to prove that the
armed services' budgets were not in line with their responsibilities in carrying out political
decisions. In this situation the services were satisfied with defense appropriations, but
ignored the responsibility to contribute all together to the national security strategy. The
backward objective circumstances for the separate services were the failures in conducting










result in operational failures, even if not in developing nation-wide security strategies, but
in implementing small scale military operations, mentioned above.
To tell the truth, the grand security strategy had never been tested, even in the
coldest periods of the cold war. 'There has been no major conflict between the to
superpowers for over 38 years."
224
In those periods the president became the key person
in national strategy-making, and he had to take the responsibility for the whole decision-
making system in person, while the services ignoring the DOD and the Congress played
their self-satisfying games at the expense of the president. 225
Various official and non-official sources of that period criticize the Department of
Defense for the unresultiveness of the policy-making system. The Locher Report, a
Congress initiated report, under the title Defense Organization: The Need for Change,
indicated that a consensus was built in Congress that the DOD required reorganization.
The report refers to the testimony of former Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger,
who stated that: '[wjithout such reform, I fear that the United States will obtain neither
the best military advice, nor the effective execution of military plans, nor the provision of
military capabilities commensurate with the fiscal resources provided, nor the most
advantageous deterrence and defense posture available to the nation"226 .
'The DOD, which ought to play a key role in presenting the military aspects of
grand strategy to the White House, in order to inform and discipline strategic choices and
resource allocations, is poorly equipped to do so"227 . The Locher report also states that
the organizational structure of the Department of Defense 'is an obstacle to performance
of the national security mission"228
,
and drew the attention to four key indicators of




This can be explained by the fact that the advategous situation based on nuclear superiority reduced the
need for innovations in non-nuclear strategic thinking. Consequently, national security in the 1960s and
1970s was provided by nuclear weapons, which, in fact split the strategy-making into nuclear and non-
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1. operational failures and deficiencies - poor inter-Service coordination during
the Vietnam conflict, the Iranian hostage rescue mission, and even the intervention in
Grenada suggest deficiencies in the planning and preparation for employment of U.S.
military forces in times of crisis;
2. acquisition process deficiencies - cost overruns, stretched-out development and
delivery schedules, and unsatisfactory weapons performance have been frequent criticism
of the acquisition process;
3. lack of strategic direction - the strategies and long-range policies of the
Department of Defense do not appear to be well formulated and are apparently only
loosely connected to subsequent resource allocation; and
4. poor interservice coordination - the programs of the individual military Services
do not appear to be well integrated around a common purpose that clearly ties means to
goals.
Nevertheless, there were two objective conditions which prevented the military
from giving adequate military advice to political decision-makers. First, the then JCS
system was institutionally incapable of deciding among service priorities, and it could not
give realistically unified strategic advice.
229 The reason for that was the fact that the JCS
and the Joint Staff were dominated by the independent services and bureaucratic politics
had bigger influence on JCS and service planning than did systematic strategic thinking. 23
The second condition was the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS)
introduced by Secretary Robert McNamara in 1969. In the planning, programming and
budgeting process the planning was inadequate and ideas on planning, separately
developed by the civilian and military sides were more often controversial than not. l
Since programming tended to dictate strategy rather than the other way around, PPBS
determined national security strategy.






B. THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT OF 1986
Being aware of the problems existing in political decision-making, the Congress
initiated a study on the organization and decision-making procedures in the Department of
Defense, which ended in January 1985. The findings of the study were in complete line
with the summary of weaknesses elaborated by Archie Barrett, a former staff member of
the House Armed Services Committee, who based his critique on the comprehensive
defense organization study of 1977 through 1980. These weaknesses include:
- 'the inability of the service dominated joint organizations to provide adequate
military advice from a national perspective;
- the overwhelming influence of the services, wholly out of proportion to their
formal responsibilities;
- the 'flawed management approach" of OSD, which slights the broad policy
function by failing to define the linkage between national objectives and military planning,
to evaluate alternative approaches to meeting military requirements, or to ensure that
decisions are actually followed through. As a result, there is an enormous 'disconnect'
between U.S. strategy and posture."232
The above described operational failures and the congressional reaction they
elicited complete the historical context that shaped the widespread congressional
perception that the U.S. military was in a need of reform. As an immediate response
Senators John Tower and Henry Jackson directed the Senate Committee on Armed
Services' staff to conduct a study of the organization and decision-making procedures of
the Department ofDefense.
In January 1985, Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn directed that a more
formal study be undertaken by the same Committee.233 The reason for that was the
strong opposition to the enactment of a bill, which would change the power distribution
inside the Pentagon, especially opposition on behalf of the service chiefs. The final report
published in October 1985 addressed a wide range of issues affecting the performance of
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the Department ofDefense. Moreover, the report also addressed two key decision-making
processes, the PPBS and the acquisition process. 234
The president on his own side charged a commission to prepare a study on the
same subject matters, including the organizational and operational arrangements of the
Congress with the separate organizations (the OSD, JCS, the Unified and Specified
Command Systems, and the military departments) of the Department of Defense. The final
report was published under the title; Toward a More Effective Defense, The Final Report
of the CSIS Defense Organization Project. The two studies, initiated by the Congress and
the president came to the same conclusions, although the recommendations of the
Commission convened by the president were less radical. The president basically accepted
these recommendations and was inclined to modify them toward more radical changes
proposed by the Congress' Committee. 235
In drafting and submitting the bill the Congress and the president showed
constructive approach, while the executive branch was seemingly divided over the issues
of defense reorganizations. Senators Goldwater and Nunn, nevertheless, were able to find
allies in the services, in officers who supported the defense reorganization act, and the
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act was law by the 1st of
October 1986.236
'One of the landmark laws of American history," is how Congressman and later
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin described the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization
Act. Speaking as the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee in 1986, Aspin
added, '[This law] is probably the greatest sea change in the history of the American
military since the Continental Congress created the Continental Army in 1775."'
By passing the law, Congress has made another important step toward
consolidating civilian control over the military and much desired unification of the armed
services. One of the basic intentions of the Congress in passing GNA was to improve
military advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of
34
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Defense. One way of improving military advice necessary to political decision-making is to
unify the military services that each of the services could feel direct responsibility for the
advice it gives. By this step aiming at the creation of a unified military, however, there is a
danger of migration of control of the military from the legislative to the executive branch,
to the secretary of defense.
238
Based on the inherent principle of the U.S. government,
which excludes the concentration of power in a single person without checks and balances,
unified command over the services exercised by the secretary of defense is undesirable.
'Congress also perceived the need for more unified direction of the U.S. armed forces, but
feared that too much centralization of authority might inhibit the discretionary authority of
Congress over defense matters."
239
The contravening concerns were clearly reflected in the objectives of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act. The scope of the new legislation showed congressional
dissatisfaction with the lack of unified direction and action of the American armed forces.
Congress attributed this problem to the dysfunctional relationships among the DOD's
main entities (SECDEF, service secretaries, CJCS, JCS, CINCs and service components,
and the service chiefs).240
'With its desire to create a more appropriate balance between joint and service
interests as a backdrop, Congress declared eight purposes for the act, ...
241
:
1. to reorganize the Department ofDefense and strengthen civilian authority within
the Department;
2. to improve the military advice provided to the president, the NSC, and the
Secretary ofDefense;
3. to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified
combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands;
4. to ensure that the authority of the commanders of the unified and specified
combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders
for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands;
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5. to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning;
6. to provide for more efficient use of defense resources;
7. to improve joint officer management policies; and
8. to enhance otherwise the effectiveness of military operations and improve the
management and administration of the Department ofDefense. 242
Each provision of the act addresses one or more of the elements of the
congressional intent. However, if one considers strictly the political decision-making
process, the most important from these objectives are the first and the second one. In the
following part of this chapter I intend to analyze these eight provisions, which would
allow to provide a basis for determining from an perspective whether the act has served its
purpose or not. The assessment of each provision is organized around the basic problems
prior to GNA, the elements of the Act's stated intent and supported by analyses of key
provisions designed to address each element.
C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT
The Senate Armed Service Committee staff study of October 16. 1985, titled
Defense Organization: The Need for Change, found that service interests rather than
strategic needs play the dominant role in shaping program decisions. 'Service decisions on
force structure and weapon developments decisions reflected their 'parochial' desire to
keep existing missions, career paths and suborganizations well-supported."243 At the same
time, 'functions (e.g. airlift, sealift, close air support) which are not central to a Service's
definition of its missions tend to be neglected"
244
. The services had chosen the tactics of
'interservice logrolling', meaning that instead of criticizing each other programs the
services had decided to remain silent and each of them could submit whatever program
they wanted.
242
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The above mentioned document in its part under the subtitle, 'Problems and
Recommendation', under point number 10. declares the mechanism for change
insufficient. The following four key problems are listed as reasons for inefficiency: (1) the
bureaucratic agreement among the services, (2) the predominant influence of the Services,
(3) inter-Service logrolling on critical issues, and (4) absolute service control over
promotions and assignments of all military officers, including those in joint duty billets.245
The study drew the conclusion that DOD does not have effective mechanism for change.
However, the defense reformers aimed at this change by shifting power from the armed
services to the mechanism of JCS, more exactly to the Chairman of the JCS, giving him
unprecedented power affecting his ability of influencing policy-making. 246 This shift of
power may undermine civilian authority and overview exercised by the Department of
Defense.
The following part of the chapter examines how the objectives of the Goldwater-
Nichols DOD Reorganization Act are met by the entities of the Department of Defense,
giving special emphases to the increased power of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
1. Civilian Authority
Giving the Chairman of JCS extraordinary power by nominating him as the
principal military adviser to the President, NSC, and the Secretary of Defense, it was
obvious that the position of the SECDEF, his civilian authority must be strengthened. In
doing so the defense reformers intended to avoid the situation when the first military
officer of the nation could bypass his immediate superior and provide subjective advice
directly to the civilian policy-makers.
247
The GNA ensured that the secretary of defense is to provide defense planning and
contingency planning guidance, thus setting the framework for uniformed military to
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secretary of defense 'With the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff'
248
will provide this written policy guidance. In doing so the CJCS reviews the
drafts of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and is afforded the opportunity to provide
comments prior to its publication. 249 The CJCS as a military person will perform this
function with more military expertise
,
which means with more competence than the
secretary of defense. Also, the final draft of the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) is
coordinated with the chairman before it is forwarded to the secretary for his approval and
subsequent submission to the NSC for presidential approval. The resulting document is the
framework for the CINCs to develop plans for military operations. But again, before the
plans are completed the CINCs' strategic concepts are forwarded to the CJCS for review
and approval. It is another opportunity to bring subjective judgment to these operational
documents by the chairman.
The GNA puts the secretary of defense into the most powerful position in the
executive branch after the president. The act addresses this intention by three major
prescriptions. First, the Congress stated 'the secretary has sole and ultimate power within
the Department of Defense on any matter on which the Secretary chooses to act'.
However, the bureaucratic layers among the DOD components and service resistance can
delay or jeopardize the actions initiated by the SECDEF based on this sole statement. 25
'Second, in designating the chairman as the principal military adviser, Congress
envisioned him becoming an ally of the secretary with a common department-wide, non-
parochial perspective."
251 The question immediately emerges is that 'what are the
guarantees or the incentives for the CJCS to become an ally?'. This power play for
influence between the SECDEF and CJCS is largely affected by the personalities fulfilling
the given assignment. A Strong" chairman can have greater influence on the president
than the secretary, even if he risks his job.
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'Third, the law specified the responsibilities of the service secretaries vis-a-vis the
secretary of defense. In determining relationship among senior civilian officials, Congress
filled a void that had existed for nearly forty years."
252
However, independent services by
partisan methods can lobby at the members of Congress for the necessary funding of their
programs leaving the service secretary out of the chain, thus decreasing the SECDEF
power to fully comply with his political guidance. This ultimately means that despite of
established relationship between the secretaries, the military interest can prevail in political
decision-making.
2. Military Advice
One of the basic reasons for the malfunction of the political decision-making
system was the 'inadequate Joint Advice". The staff report, Defense Organization: The
Need for Change, states that '[t]he JCS system has not been capable of adequately
fulfilling its responsibility to provide useful and timely unified military advice"
253
. The
'inadequate Joint Advice" caused malfunctioning in many activities in the DOD.
'Shortcomings in their ability meaningfully to address these issues have had a serious
impact on the ability ofDOD to prepare for and to conduct military operations in times of
^««o 254
crisis.
The staff report explains the inefficiency of the military advice by the inefficiency
of the JCS system, which had required the Service Chiefs to be an effective advocate of
their own services and joint interests at the same time. This 'duel-hatting" yielded weak
JCS advice that simply reflects the four Services' unanimous agreement. In answer to the
problem of 'inadequate Joint Advice" Congress assigned increased responsibility to the
Chairman of JCS, made him the principal military adviser to the National Command









However, with the possibility provided by the Act to the Chairman that he may
participate in NSC meetings, the basic principles of political decision-making were
violated, which claim that the military should not be involved in political decision-making.
And even if the Act vested the chairman with no command authority, he continues to
remain a military person.
Of course, if the chairman is the principal military adviser, he can provide less
biased, less service-oriented, more unified, but at the same time more subjective advice.
So, the chance for subjectivity is ensured by GNA, even though the chairman has to rely
on the Services for comprehensive expertise. On the other hand, there is no guarantee that
the personnel drawn for Joint Staff duties continues to be strongly influenced by the
interests of their parent services. 255
'Nonetheless, a key issue remains concerning the manner in which the chairman
formulates the advice he provides to the NCA. There is evidence that the Chairman may
not adequately consult with other members of the JCS before providing his advice to the
NCA."256 The issue of consultation with the Services' representatives have become very
sensitive, when the chairman reviews service budget proposals and spending priorities.
These situations represent simple bargaining between the CJCS and the Services if the
chairman really wants to get useful information and expertise from the services to be able
to formulate "adequate Joint Advice".
In this respect, the 'enacting of Goldwater-Nichols, then, Congress executed a
dramatic turnabout from its previous defense of service autonomy, but dictated changes,
that posed uncertain consequences for the distribution of power and authority within the
military"
257
. Even though the Act made the chairman more powerful at the expense of the









3. Clear Responsibility for the CINCs
In order further to reduce the influence of the Services based on exclusive service
interests and better focus the Department ofDefense strategic planning on the needs of the
unified and specified commanders, Congress determined that the roles of the
Commanders-in-Chiefs also had to be strengthened.
258 To achieve this objective of
placing clear responsibility on CINCs, Capitol Hill beside giving more command authority
also clarified the chain of to each commander and emphasized that all CINCs were
responsible to the president and the secretary of defense for the performance of assigned
missions. The GNA prescribed the chain of command as running from the president to the
secretary to the CINC. The Joint Chiefs including the chairman were explicitly removed.
This action meant that majority of fighting forces were placed under the authority of the
CINCs.
The Goldwater-Nichols Act not only strengthened the Chairman of the JCS from
below by assigning him the functions previously performed by the Joint Chiefs, but the Act
also added power from above. Congress included provisions in the Act that allow the
chairman to assist the NCA in overseeing the CINCs. Specifically, the president may direct
that all communications between himself or the secretary and the CINCs go through the
chairman.
259
Moreover, the president may rely on the chairman in assisting him to perform
command functions. The secretary of defense may assign the chairman responsibilities in
assisting in overseeing the combatant commands; however, such assignment confers no
command authority. 260 Although the chairman has no command authority, his role in
making the chain of command function effectively is pivotal. This means that the chairman
besides his advisory role may effect the quality ofcommand starting with the president and
ending with the CINCs. In such a way he can influence the president in fulfilling his
supreme command function, which would lead to interference with the above described
chain of command.
258
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Another intention of the GNA was to make the CINCs responsible for identifying
requirements for military capabilities, the chairman responsible for synthesizing the
requirements and the services were tasked to fulfill the requirements. This new function is
another example of the chairman's increased ability to effect warflghting capabilities of the
combat forces. One may argue that the GNA did not only make the chairman involved in
policy-making, but also in creating the basis for implementing those policy decisions. On
the other hand, even though the CINCs are to determine necessary combat capabilities,
they must limit themselves by the potential capabilities of the services, since the services
control the concepts development and research and development capabilities that yield
potential weapon system and equipment.
4. Improving Strategy Formulation and Contingency Planning
The StafTReport to the Committee on Armed Services of October 16, 1985 states
that Strategic planning is inhibited by the absence of an organizational focus on major
missions and strategic goals"261 . Moreover, the Armed Services Committee claimed that
planning in DOD was underemphasized and ineffective. Such planning was fiscally
unconstrained, and strategy and resources were weakly linked. As the failures of military
operations of late 70s and early 80s demonstrated contingency plans had limited utility in
crisis, often because they were not based on valid political assumptions. 'The operational
deficiencies during the Vietnam war, the seizure of Pueblo, the Iranian hostage rescue
mission, and the incursion into Grenada were the result of the failure adequately to
implement the concept of unified command."262
Consequently, through Goldwater-Nichols, Congress sought to improve strategy
formulation at the level of the Chairman of JCS. For this purpose Congress formulated
four principal provisions set forth in the Act. First, at the NCA level it required the
president to submit an annual report on national security strategy in which the president
describes comprehensively the short-and long-term national security strategies and
provides assessment of the risks associated with implementing the strategies. However, as
261




the practical implementation of this provision shows, the national security strategy reports
submitted by the president do not enable the Congress to the full extent to assess,
approve, and modify fiscal programs and their utility to provide optimally balanced
support of national power has been limited.
2 3
These difficulties derive from the broad
nature of the statements of administration policies concerning national security. If the
president submitted a fully comprehensive, detailed report he would yield flexibility in his
ability to negotiate the defense budget with the Congress. Furthermore, a more detailed
report would seize the bias in shaping resource allocation and in case the real geo-strategic
developments do not coincide with those envisaged in the report, the competence of the
president would be questioned. 'Thus, the president's decision not to implement fully the
national security strategy provisions of the GNA can be at least partially explained by the
constitutionally created tension between the legislative and executive branches of the U.S.
government, a valued characteristic of American politics."264
The GNA empowered the chairman with specific strategic and contingency
planning responsibilities. With respect to strategic planning he is to assist the NCA in
providing for the strategic direction of the armed forces and to prepare strategic plans
which conform to resource guidance provided by the secretary of defense. ' This
provision can improve strategic planning, since it relies on professional military expertise
of the chairman, at the same time there is the danger of subjectivity in the chairman's
advice. To assist the National Command Authorities in providing strategic direction, the
chairman prepares a national military strategy. 266 The way the strategy is formulated
constitutes a part of a larger classified document - titled, National Military Strategy
Document - which is more detailed and specific. In 1990, the Chairman directed the
revision of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) to incorporate 'the appropriate
statutory responsibilities of the Chairman ... as delineated in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of
263
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Regardless of this broader document, the formal National Military Strategy
contributes only in the most general sense to the process of strategy formulation,
notwithstanding the intent of the GNA.
The Chairman provides for the preparation and review of the contingency plans,
which conform to NCA policy guidance. 268 The chairman's translation of the policies set
forth in the secretary's Contingency Planning Guidance into specific planning tasks for the
CINCs is promulgated by the chairman's Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). In
response to the JSCP, the CINCs develop operation plans and submit to the chairman for
approval.
269
Additionally, the chairman is also actively involved in the Crisis Action
Planning Process. The substantial involvement of the chairman in all these planning
processes is in line with the provisions of GNA. This intended role of the chairman was
successfully played in the planning processes prior to and after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait,
however, the time frame for planning did not put the Chairman under extreme conditions.
In addition to providing for the preparation and review of the contingency plans,
the Chairman is also required by the GNA to prepare strategic plans. 27 ' Given the global
responsibilities and perspectives to the Chairman, he is best suited to reconcile, rationalize,
and harmonize the CINCs' plans. The chairman's effort in this regard must be more than
merely compiling the CINCs' plans. In fact, it can be said that 'by performing this strategy
formulation role, the Chairman could ensure that contingency planning better adheres to
policy guidance and would be in a better position to provide strategic advice to the
NCA"271 . This state of affairs, however, will not necessarily assure the required
interaction between policy and operational planners at the planning level.
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5. Providing More Efficient Use of Defense Resources
By enacting the GNA in 1986 the congressional intent included the 'hiore efficient
use of defense resources"
272
. It was a direct consequence of the 'testimony before
Congress, which revealed that vague and ambiguous DOD objectives permitted service
interests rather than strategic needs to play dominant role in shaping resource
decisions"
273
. At the same time the secretary of defense was not either in a position to
oversee resource planning, since he lacked an independent military assessment of service
programs and budgets. In order to achieve a more efficient use of defense resources,
Congress granted the chairman additional power to be able to form an independent
military perspective that had been lacking. It has been reached by the chairman's new role
in this process to solicit the CINCs requirements, provide national level analyses of those
requirements, assess the extent to which the proposed programs of the services effectively
satisfy the CINCs, requirements, and advice the NCA accordingly. Thus, in theory the
programs and budgets of the military departments and other DOD components conform
with strategic plans and CINC priorities. 'The chairman was also empowered to submit
alternative program and budget recommendations to the secretary."274
Implementation has not achieved the potential of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms
with the exception of General Powell's effective use of his resource advisory role in
formulating the Base Force, that meant a 25% reduction in force structure. Even though,
reducing the Cold War force structure by 25% represented the most significant and
difficult resource issue faced by the Pentagon over the last decade, one can argue that this
reduction was of objective necessity. Change in the international security environment, the
fall of the Soviet superpower made this downsizing possible.
Tools which the chairman can use to fulfill his responsibilities related to more
efficient use of defense resources include the CINCs' Integrated Priority List, the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), the chairman's authority to evaluate the
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preparedness of the combatant commands275
,
and the Chairman's Current Readiness
System.
Defense experts claim that the JROC process can be misused. 'If instead of
informing the independent advice of the Chairman JROC were used to pre-negotiate issues
in the old log-rolling fashion, the military would come full circle to the wasteful, pre-
Goldwater-Nichols days."276 With similar approach the independent services by locking
arms can politically overpower the secretary of defense and Congress on significant
resource issues. The chairman is responsible for rejecting these activities to the
independent services and avoiding to surrender his independent perspective, otherwise, he
will abandon the intentions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. To achieve more efficient use
of defense resources Congress looked to the chairman. Fulfilling his tasks in this field he
can effectively link planning and implementation, thus facilitating the most rational use of
national resources.
In passing the GNA, Congress also intended to improve joint officer management
policies, and to enhance otherwise the effectiveness of military operations and improve
the management and administration of the Department of Defense. 27 ' In implementing all
these provisions the chairman has tremendous responsibilities. To improve operational
effectiveness, for example, the Chairman of the JCS is responsible for developing joint
doctrine and joint training policies. Evidently in this activity he relies on the Joint Staff
Under his subordination, but at the same time his personal input is decisive.
Many of the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act focused on improving DOD
management and administration. 'But in adding this objective Congress had in mind
specific structural problems that were hindering sound management." 2 i These problems
included excessive spans of control, unnecessary staff layers and duplication of effort,
steady growth in headquarters staff, inadequate supervision of defense agencies, and an
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uneven division ofwork among defense components. To reduce the span of control of the
Secretary of Defense, the GNA required the secretary to delegate supervision of each
defense agency and field activity to an OSD official or to the chairman. The chairman role
as an overseer of the unified commands also helped to lessen the secretary's supervisory
burdens. However, it is arguable whether this function of the chairman reinforces his
position vis-a-vis the secretary or not. Nevertheless, it gives the chance for the chairman
of being subjective and more military-minded in assessing these commands.
6. The Goldwater-Nichols Act and Civilian Control
'The fundamental changes in the relationship between the key players in the
national military command structure caused by the Goldwater-Nichols Act have had a
profound effect on civilian control."
279
The Constitution set forth the security related duties
and responsibilities of the president as Commander -in-Chief and Congress, with the
necessary checks and balances. These provisions are broad enough to allow to both side
the necessary flexibility to act to their discretion for the security of the American people.
The GNA is trying unnecessarily to prescribe the president the chain of command, he
should establish between himself and the armed forces. In this way the Congress let the
president, as Commander-in-chief establish any chain of command he considers proper.
"Of course, the President always possessed that authority."280
'By establishing the Chairman as the principal military adviser to the President, and
by giving the Chairman control of the Joint Staff, Goldwater-Nichols established a de
facto national general staff."
281
According to this passage, the Joint Staff to the full extent
for the chairman and tries to find the 'best" ultimate solution on any issue at debate. In the
process of decision-making the civilian side is usually confronted only with the 'best"
ultimate solution provided by the uniformed military, thus the civilians are deprived the
opportunity to choose from a variety of options. It streamlines the decision-making, but
79
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might be perceived as a threat to civilian control and can make the civilian control a




The provisions of the GNA also changed the power relations related to relative
authority of the secretary, the chairman and the Joint Staff. It happened to the detriment of
the civilian side. The Goldwater-Nichols Act reduced the Secretariat significantly and
transferred several key functions to the chairman. The Secretary of Defense basically
formulates only the general defense policy guidelines. On the other hand, as it has been
proved through this entire chapter, the Chairman controls the Joint Staff and he is also
responsible for key strategic functions, such as strategic direction; strategic planning;
contingency planning; requirement, programs and budget; doctrine, training, and
education; and roles and missions. Thus the Chairman is responsible for the most
significant decisions relating to national security.
283
Supporters of GNA, of course, can argue that the chairman acts within the
perimeter drawn by the secretary of defense and the chairman makes only
recommendations, which may or may not be accepted by the secretary at the president. In
the worst case for the chairman, the secretary can release him from his duties. But, being
aware of the nature of bureaucratic processes in political decision-making, the chances
that the recommendations of a single military officer will be accepted are very high. And
one should not doubt that the Joint Staff in working for the chairman are going to make
the best arguments to back up the chairman's recommendations. Moreover, the 'Unified
recommendation" provided by the military side might be more valuable than the
fragmented proposal made by the fractured civilian side.
Objectively weighing the effect ofGNA on the balance of civil-military power over
political decision-making, it can be said that by tremendously strengthening the role of the
chairman to the detriment of service chiefs, and giving great emphasis to Joint Staff under
full supervision of the chairman, the military's influence on political decision-making has
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grown substantially. 'Combining the power of the chairman with the relative effectiveness
of the Joint Staff versus its civilian counterparts sets all the necessary conditions for
military usurpation of civilian decision-making authority."
284
D. CONCLUSIONS
The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act pursued
two major objectives. First, it reorganized DOD and strengthened civilian authority.
Second, it improved the military advice provided to the President, National Security
Council, and Secretary of Defense. The second objective was aimed at the improvement of
civilian political decision-making related to national security.
Under objective civilian control the military is excluded from the political decision-
making process. However, as the given case of the United States shows, the military is
always trying to influence those political decisions, because it provides justification for its
existence and the material and human resources mean real political weight or power.
In democratic civil-military relations the extent to which the military can influence
the civilian side is difficult to predict, but it is evident that in peacetime and wartime the
military as the guarantee for security must be taken into account. The final outcome in
peacetime should provide dominance for civilian values, while in war military values and
first of all military professionalism must be given full consideration. GNA may have made
the decision-making system more effective, but this efficiency has come at the expense of
the Secretary's and Congress' ability to exercise civilian control over the military, thus, at
the cost of the civilian side. In this way in peacetime GNA has given greater emphasis to
military values, rather than civilian ones. In practical terms it means that the reorganization
act has immensely strengthened the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
never seen in the U.S. history before, and has made the Joint Staff more effective. These
two unexpected consequences together lead to a situation in which the military side can
overpower the civilian side, more exactly the secretary of defense. The Goldwater-Nichols




Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a result, the Act has set the conditions whereby the military might
usurp some of the authority of its civilian leadership. 285
By improving the military advice necessary to political decision-making, the
Goldwater-Nichols Act offers the illusion that decisions on national security can be made
easier. 'However, in practice such advice can amount to de facto decisions by a single
officer and could make mere figureheads of responsible civilian authorities."286 The
danger in this situation is the Subjectivity" of the military advice based on the discretion
of the chairman instead of a corporate body.
By creating a powerful chairman, thus gradually eroding civilian control over the
military, the Congress also lost some of its power, but still less than the Secretary of
Defense. After the enactment of the Act Congress is still in a convenient situation to
observe the struggle between the executive and the military sides. At the same time
Congress did not abandon the strategy of divide and rule. 'Legislators carried out that
strategy to new extremes, creating a powerful chairman to provide additional source of
military advice, and putting him into competition with the services (who are granted the
right to contradict the chairman's advice with the president and the Congress). 28
By enacting the GNA Congress chose the most convenient way to try to improve
political decision-making, but the danger is that in doing so it elevated the military to the
level of political decision-making that fall outside its proper sphere, and it can ultimately
lead to tensions between the military and the society, the latter seeing this final result as a










A. THE IMPORTANCE OF SOLVING THE "MILITARY ISSUE":
SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
Based on the controversy between democratic social norms and mission of the
armed forces in general, civil-military relations exist in any society with military forces.
The functional requirement suggests that Society needs the military, an effective military
to protect it against external threat"
288
. This requirement derives from the external threats
to the state's security. The objective requirement for defense should be matched with the
Social tolerance" stemming from societal forces, ideologies and institutions dominant
within society.
28
Within democratic governance '[t]he objective ... on the institutional
level is to develop a system of civil-military relations, which will maximize military
security at the least sacrifice of other social values."
290
The inherent activity of all societies is to produce and distribute values. These
processes work best in ideal cases when the society faces no external threat. Should an
external threat appear these societal functions must be protected. The protection is the
vested responsibility of the military. The armed forces in acting so, is not directly involved
in the economic process, but indirectly - by providing defense for the production and
distribution processes - facilitates the functioning of these processes, thus the normal
functioning of the society. It is very complicated to access the value of such protection,
especially in peacetime.
If the military is not directly involved in the maintenance of the society, it can be
regarded as a consumer of the values. That is why the ultimate objective, especially in a
democracy, is to provide maximum protection at the least possible cost. The society in any
event has to pay the price of protection, but '{t]he structure and operating mechanism of
state institutions should enable the government both to look after the national interest and
"701










'One of the basic tenets of representative democracy is that politicians who
exercise political power are answerable to those who have elected them, and in whose
name they formulate and implement policies. 29 The military establishment in the society is
subordinated to the electorate through constitutional mechanism. Defense is a function of
government and as such should be subject to ultimate sanction by the elected legislative:
the armed forces are part of the executive and are part of those governed. Armed forces
are thus an instrument of the state; they should have no independent or autonomous
political role, nor should they interfere with the running of the country, and should never
be deployed in support ofnarrow partisan, politicized interests.
293
Consequently, rather than the military, the democratically elected civilian authority
must have the legitimate power to make policy, including security and defense policy.
Nevertheless, the military seeks to influence those political decisions which concern its
existence. The most important of them are those constitutional provisions that
'accommodate" the military in the society, including command lines which facilitate the
actual use of the armed forces. Similarly important are the laws and decrees that determine
the legal status in the society of uniformed military and those prescribing the emoluments
paid in return for the armed protection of societal values. Another important area of
legislation concerns the military's roles and the missions and the budget appropriation,
which also enables the armed forces to carry out predetermined tasks and missions.
In the life circle of a democratic society one can distinguish four different stages of
democratic evolution: (1) decay of authoritarian rule, (2) transition, (3) consolidation, and
(4) maturing of democratic political order.
294
Depending on the particular phase a country
faces, the society has to solve problems of different character in civil-military relations.
For example, established liberal democracies, such as the United States in maturing of
democratic political order forever perfects its civil-military relations and seeks better




Ministry of Defense of the United Kingdom, Directorate of Management and Consultancy Services,
Study No 810., Review of Parliamentary Oversight of the Hungarian MOD and Democratic Control of the
Hungarian Defense Forces. February 1996, p. 3.
94 Doh Chull Shin, "On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and Evolution of Recent Theory
and Research", World Politics. Vol. 47., October 1994, No. 1. p. 143.
86
European Region, however, are at the stage of democratic transition and early
consolidation. These nations are preoccupied with the accommodation of the military to
democracy and to find the most suitable size, type, composition and missions for their
forces. It is an especially difficult tasks, since economic backwardness often impedes even
the usual institutional processes related to the functioning of democracy, not to speak
about the 'luxury" to provide funding for the military from scarce resources of the society.
Other domains of societal life seemingly demand priority vis-a-vis military spending.
At any phase of democratization the military secures and justifies the resources
necessary for its existence. The issue of military involvement in political decision-making,
or one can formulate in a different way; the level and structure of power delegated to
high-ranking military officials is of crucial importance. And it is especially true in the phase
of transition when the success of the whole democratic process is under question,
democracy is still fragile and the victory in democratic changes should not be taken for
granted. Consequently, the success or failure of democratic transition basically depends on
successful solution of the proper role for a soldier in a democracy. In established
democracies, where the issue at stake is not the success of democratic transition or
survival of democracy, civil-military relations are usually related to resource allocation
depending on the changing external circumstances, at the same time keeping a close eye
on the tenet of civilian supremacy.
Authoritarian regimes of any kind perceive the military as a chief instrument in
maintaining the regime. Military regimes solely rely on the armed forces to repress society,
thus violating the basic principle, according to which military is to be used generally for
external defense and one cannot speak about democratic values, such as civilian
supremacy in military matters. Of course, in this case the military is highly politicized and
is actively represented in political decision-making, and it would be improper to speak
about any professionalism except exercising terror and violence. The best examples are
such former authoritarian and military regimes in South America, as Chile and Peru.
The laws of physics may be applicable to social sciences, especially such as the one
on attraction of gravity. The law would say: the larger the extent of the involvement of the
military in maintaining non-democratic regime is, the bigger privileges it enjoys under the
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regime, the more committed it is to that regime. 29 ' And if such is the case, after
democratic shifts it will be more complicated to solve the 'military issue", which means to
de-politicize the armed forces, to increase their professionalism and to obtain civilian
supremacy culminating in objective democratic control over the armed forces. In
democracy the military must be loyal to the Constitution and must serve the interests of
the people, not a single person, let us say, a dictator or a minority of people.
296 The
military must voluntarily accept civilian supremacy in the whole democratic process,
starting with the transition; it must give up partisanship or other non-democratic means to
obtain certain objectives.
The subjective conditions of accommodation of the military in the society require
competency in military issues among the civilian side, capable of a.) expertly determining
the role and missions of the forces, based on security policy priorities, and b.) give
reasonable, comparable prospects for the military to prove itself in the society as citizens
as well as professionals. The military, which pursues its own interests in the society gets
quickly aware about the outcomes of transition, the results of bargaining and will be
willing to play according to democratic rules, if it feels the chance of winning. In this case,
the victory means trust respect and adequate material provisions. The civil society can,
however, significantly reduce the role of the military in the state, thus its influence on
social processes, through unreasonable reduction in it size.
In the transitional phase especially, but during democratic consolidation, as well,
civil society, political society and the state have specific roles to play to ensure the success
of democratic transition, including the successful accommodation of the military. Civil
society must take an equitable burden of making the armed forces accepted by all
members of the society. To deal reasonably with the military the civil society must have
the competence and expertise in military issues. It gives them a fighting edge in the
transition, during the democratic bargaining and credible basis for objective civilian control
throughout the entire evolution of mature democracy. This expertise is attainable directly






civilian-led institutes dealing with national security issues. 29 ' This kind of competence
enable the civilian side to contribute to the crafting of laws and decrees on security and
defense policy principles, service and other laws.
The political society's biggest contribution to the 'military issue" is the
establishment of permanent standing committees in the legislature, or in party-based
parliamentary cabinets, which are obliged to oversight and monitor the country's military
and intelligence organizations. The Defense Committees of the Parliaments or equivalent
organizations in presidential democracies provide the opportunity to ensure that
professional standards meet the requirements and decisions of policy. But, this institutional
arrangements should function as a two-way street, meaning that the military, the top
military personnel could use it to officially channel information to the legislative. Thus, the
Defense Committee is an important stage in conveying professional needs of the armed
forces and in preparing the bills for political decision-making by the civilian executive
authority.
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Beside this arrangements the members of the Parliament must have the opportunity
individually to increase their personal expertise on defense related issues. One clearly see
that there are two ways of improving the legislative authority's military competence.
Either centrally, by creating an information center available to Parliament members, or
individually by providing funds for them to employ military experts in their professional
staffs.
The so-called fourth branch of the government in a democracy - the media - has
also to facilitate the evolution of durable civil-military relations. Regardless how
independent or unbiased the media is, it has certain obligations to educate the whole
society on security related issues, thus helping to accommodate the military in the
democratic society.
The interests of the democratic state dictates that it should promote the expansion
of the range of people and institutions in civil and political society with a comprehensive






enlightened, on military affairs, state can promote military professionalism in an indirect
way, which means denying the military the chance of intervening into internal politics. At
the same time the state is increasing its own chances for exercising objective democratic
control. I argue that the state has to play an active role in facilitating democratic transition
vis-a-vis the military. If the executive actively involved in transitional issues and attempts
to increase military professionalism, and reduce the risk of any military intervention in
democratic processes, the success of democratic transition can be taken for granted as far
as the "military issue" is concerned.
Alfred Stephan claims that because of the military constitutes a part of the state
apparatus and national defense is considered to be a state function, some form of National
Security Council is an appropriate forum for high-level decisions on national security. 29
The existence and proper functioning of the Council vindicates the commitment of the
civilian side to take an active part in policy formulation. And more importantly for the
military, any involvement of the professional military side into the functioning of the
Council, should the need arise, would provide the second most important channel for
obtaining professional advice before policy decisions are made, or to match strategic
alternatives with strategic capabilities.
The quality of interagency processes within the state apparatus cannot be
overemphasized enough. In implementing political decisions the effectiveness of
interagency activity will basically determine the outcome of democratic processes. It is
particularly true in case of fledgling democracies, where the institutions are still in the
process of establishment and despite constitutional provisions the areas of responsibilities
might be overlapping or missing the necessary interface.
As the example of the United States demonstrates, there is a constant struggle
between the legislative and executive for political power, even though the provisions
regarding policy-making are set forth in the Constitution. As the analysis of the
Goldwater-Nichols 1986 Defense Reorganization Act shows, 'the GNA also had far-
reaching consequences for the distribution of power and functions between civilians - in




Goldwater-Nichols was to strengthen the influence of the secretary over the military, the
Act included a number of measures that would increase the relative influence of Congress.
Legislators retained the right of the services to make end runs around the defense
secretary, a key to congressional power vis-a-vis the executive. Congress also insisted that
the chairman and president offer more explicit statements of their defense strategies and




B. MILITARY STRUCTURES AND MILITARY LEADERS IN THE
POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
The appropriate, balanced structure of the military establishment is a matter of high
priority to secure the basic principles of democracy. This provision means that the military
establishment first of all has to facilitate the pre-eminence of objective democratic control
over the armed forces. Based on checks and balances the structure of the forces, for the
sake of democracy, should exclude the concentration of power vested in a single person
either on the military or the civilian side. It should prevent the misuse of military force,
deny politicians with military ambitions, or military personnel with political ambitions. On
the other hand, the type of the structure of the military establishment is a matter of
traditions. Some would argue that the Prussian style general staff is unacceptable, since
too much authority and power is concentrated in the hand of the chief of general staff,
who if desires so could overthrow or undermine the incumbent civilian government.
Civilian control of the military exemplifies the principle that the military force is
not an end in itself, but a means that the civil authority can use to bring about specific
political objectives. The military force has to implement political decisions. Tactical
decisions regarding the military operations in the field de facto must serve the political and
strategic goals set up by civil authority, meaning that political decisions in the military
structure are filtering down in the form of operational commands. Accordingly, a direct
command line has to be established between the commander-in-chief of the armed forces




Civilian control on the level of society is based on the Constitution and
constitutional powers are vested in the branches of the government. Civilian control first
of all is achieved by nominating civilian leadership into the executive branch, then by
civilian leadership of the professional military department, the department or ministry of
defense. In the parliamentary system of democratic government the prime minister
nominates the civilian minister of defense. The minister of defense must be supported by
civilian subordinates (state secretaries, understate secretaries, heads of the departments) to
oversee the day-to-day activities of the armed forces. The MOD is a part of the state
bureaucracy and responsible for the implementation of political decisions. Civilianization
of the ministries is still an issue in many former socialist countries, which are in transition
to democracy. The structure of the Ministry of Defense has to ensure a political
continuation for implementing political decisions. One would argue that civilian appointees
are needed to supervise the implementation of political directives, and most importantly to
provide a control for spending the defense budget as it has been approved by the
legislature.
In the presidential system of the United States the president appoints the civilian
secretary of defense, who presides over the Department of Defense, which incorporates
the four military services. Civilian control is further strengthened by the statutory
provisions to establish fundamental security policies and judicial defense of civilian
control.
This thesis has frequently stated that the military should be excluded from political
decision-making. The constitutional provisions and institutional arrangements guarantee
this principle. However, these structures do not exclude the possibility, that the military in
its own interests will always try to influence those decisions. Security related political
decisions must be well established in the interests of the whole society. Civilian makers of
policy have to base their decisions on professional expertise, and advice. The 1986
Goldwater-Nichols Act sought to improve professional advice to the president, NSC, and
the secretary of defense. This action reflects a good strategy on behalf of the civilian side
to obtain professional advice before making political decisions. The chairman of the JCS is
the single individual who can speak for the military as a whole. By passing the 1986 Act,
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the legislators made it certain that this professional advice provided by the chairman is well
established, since the Act made him responsible for, or involved in, all the aspects of the
military means and political ends, starting with contingency planning, through his possible
involvement in making the chain ofcommand function effectively, to the more efficient use
of defense resources. In doing so he is aware about the preparation as well as the
implementations of the political decisions, not only for the military, but the whole nation.
Fulfilling his assignment, thus the Chairman's activity involves both professional
and political aspects. Dealing with sensitive security issues, the chairman cannot help but
consider the political consequences of his advice. In this way, as Colin Powell did in 1993-
1994, the chairman may become politicized. By nominating the chairman as the senior
military adviser the GNA intended to make him an ally of the president. This presumption
may lead to certain ambiguities in the relationships among the president, the secretary of
defense and the chairman. Such a formulation of the way the chairman can give advice to
the president does not exclude the possibility of a direct contact between them, at the
same time ignoring the SECDEF. However, one can suppose that it is in the best interest
of the chairman to keep his immediate superior informed about the advice he gives to the
president.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COUNTRIES IN TRANSITION TO
DEMOCRACY
In democratic countries the armed forces have to serve the interests of the nation.
Military actions must be subservient to political decisions. This principle must be
implemented in practice by objective democratic control over the armed forces. Emerging
democracies facing the difficult situation of democratic transition have to accommodate
their militaries in the society, if they opted for the defense of democratic achievements.
The case of the United States offers a rich ground to examine the evolution of
civil-military relations. The US experience is valuable, but nonetheless quite complex.
However, based on this case study, two basic assumptions can be made. First, the military
establishment as a whole, and its different parts must be flexible. They must have a certain
capacity to surmount the changed circumstances. Military organizations are in constant
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search for their most effective structure. Should the external security environment of the
country change, the defense organization and the way of its management should be
changed as well.
Second, civil-military cooperation in solving security related issues is important.
The term 'civil-military relations" refers to a certain kind of interaction between the
civilian and the military sides without particular definition of the nature of those relations.
Such relations range from total ignorance of the civilian interests or military interests.
Both these extreme alternatives are very unlikely to be found in democratic societies since
there is an objective necessity to defend the country, for that purpose it needs the armed
forces. So, for a balanced relationship the civilian side as well as the military has to find
the way how to cooperate better. In inter-ministerial terms, for example there is a
possibility between the ministry of defense and foreign ministry for closer interaction by
employing active military personnel in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as it is done in the
US State Department. To further improve inter-agency processes, for example in
Hungary, as it was recommended by Jeffrey Simon, an interagency body (a National
Security Council) should be established to formulate national security policy. 'Such body
under the Prime Minister ... could bring together ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense,
Interior, Finance, and Industry to formulate policy and provide clear direction to the
armed forces."301 Even though, however one might observe that this goal has not always
worked in the United States.
In 1996, Jeffrey Simon in analyzing civil-military relations in light of possible
NATO membership for Hungary, warns about other deficiencies in the Hungarian defense
establishment. To improve the situation he makes the following recommendations:
- it is necessary to ensure that the Hungarian Defense Ministry maintains real
civilian oversight ofthe military:
- to exclude the duplication of functions in the MOD and General Staff, the two
bogy should be incorporated;
- the defense ministry has yet to implement a mid-and long-term planning
mechanism;
301
Jeffrey Simon, p. 174.
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- the defense ministry has to establish an Operational Requirements Branch to
assess and compare the technical capabilities of weapons and systems;
- more resources has to be provided for force modernization.
With the defense reform started 1. December 1996. and lasting 31. December
1997., most of these recommendations have been realized. Hungary has changed the force
and command structure as of 1. September 1997. and established the Joint Defense Staff
and the Service Staffs. Moreover, the Joint Defense Staff has been incorporated into the
Ministry of Defense. Due to this reorganization the integrated defense ministry links the
defense minister (and his administrative and policy advisers) directly to the command
structure. This kind of the ministerial structure also facilitates the flow of defense needs
from the armed forces to the government, opening up defense policy and activities to
public scrutiny and accountability. These changes ultimately provide a more efficient
oversight of the Hungarian Defense Forces and a more flexible structure to the whole
defense establishment.
These defense reorganizations will have positive and negative consequences. By
creating the Joint Defense Staff and integrating it to the MOD the military's weight have
increased and hopefully professional expertise will be more visible and utilisable. It means
also that the military's voice in effecting political decisions and implementing them will be
much stronger than it used to be. By creating Service Staffs and separate services, such as
Army and Air Force, the possibility of the well-known in the US case interservice rivalry
or interservice competition has been created. Scarce defense budget will be the reason for
such competition, when each of the services will try to convince the Joint Chief and the
legislation about the priority of their service needs. This kind of competition between the
services can be avoided by providing adequate defense budget, but the present defense
appropriation will not support similar tendency.
By the 1996-97 defense reorganization the Hungarian military has reached the
situation in which it is more capable of effecting security related political decisions. It
depends now on the military side to what extent it can exploit this opportunity, can put
pressure through the defense minister on the executive, and on the executive branch how
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